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ABSTRACT
An analysis of local government strategies to cutback expenditures mandated
by Proposition 2 1/2 in Massachusetts is the focus of this thesis. Ten
local governments in Massachusetts, five cities and five towns are used
to evaluate the way local governments develop their budgets in period of
retrenchment.
The study of local government cutback strategies is primarily a study of
the politics of the budgetary process: fiscal and political constraints
limit budget priorities; certain groups are more vulnerable to or pro-
tect themselves from cuts; management centralizes its budgetary authority;
revenue uncertainty and new revenue options must be considered; and,
efficiency improved when cuts have a demoralizing effect on the workforce.
These considerations reflect the political realities that confront
budget-makers and serve as the key points that are discussed in the thesis.
The thesis is organized to represent the stages of the budget process
and to develop the interactive nature of the budget process between
executives, elected officials, and interest groups.
The thesis shows that local governments do not develop explicit cutback
strategies to cope with cutbacks. Rather, priorities were guided by a
very general set of criteria. In this environment, more organized groups
in public safety, fire services and garbage collection were spared from
large cuts. The result of protecting "harder" services was to force the
major reductions into "softer" services--libraries, education, parks and
recreation, and human services. The thesis concludes with a series of
recommendations designed to improve and integrate planning into the
municipal budgeting process.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Lawrence Susskind
Title: Department Head, Associate Professor of
Urban Studies and Planning
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INTRODUCTION
Local governments in Massachusetts are facing a major dilemma: how
can public services be maintained while state mandated property reductions
are causing local revenues to decline? Local officials are being pressed
to respond to cutbacks with more efficient management, to search for new
revenues, and to determine which programs, if any, can be reduced. Busi-
ness Week suggests that the current crisis in local government finance is
more serious than at any other time in our recent past. Four separate
forces are at work: federal aid to state and local governments, after
growing almost fourfold in the 1970's, will be reduced by 11 percent in
1983; state and local tax bases are shrinking due to tax limitation meas-
ures and taxes that are tied to cuts in federal taxes; municipal bonds are
not nearly so attractive as they once were; and interest rates have
reached record-breaking levels--doubling the rates that states and muni-
cipalities must pay for money since 1977. The effect of these four
forces, plus a fifth, inflation, poses a severe threat to basic govern-
ment services such as public safety, sewer, water, libraries, roads, mass
(1)
transit, and education. In addition, an increasing percentage of local
expenditures must be committed to "fixed costs" (e.g., repayment of loans,
insurance, pensions, etc.) shifting the burden of cuts to direct public
services.(2) The result, of course, is expanding pressure from citizens,
employees, and special interest groups.
The purpose of this thesis is to identify and understand the strate-
gies that local governments in Massachusetts have used to reduce expendi-
tures and to cope with demands to protect certain jobs and service levels.
The study of local cutback strategies is primarily a study of the politics
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of the budgetary process. Political activity is the pursuit of indivi-
dual or group goals within a decision-making structure.(3) Political
action is motivated by varying conceptions of the goals and priorities
which are at issue: the political process entails negotiation and argu-
ment about which choices ought to be made. (4)
There are four basic questions that must be answered once it is
clear that cutbacks must be made:
1. Which programs and which groups will absorb the burdens of the cuts?
2. What is the fairest process for apportioning reductions?
3. What new sources of revenue, if any, can be used to prevent losses
in services?
4. How can productivity be enhanced?
These questions provide the framework within which cutback strategies are
implemented. Typically, in local government, top management or the chief
executive articulates a strategy aimed at coping with the "reality of the
decline" taking account of both employment demands and service needs.
Etzioni has described the problem for the political decisionmaker: "The
dilemma of power is how to increase the capacity to act without generating
counter-currents so that the very movement forward will not reduce the
capacity to move on this and future occasions."(5) There is often a lack
of consensus about the necessity and legitimacy of proposed cutbacks.
When groups mobilize to protect their political positions and to resist
cuts, local officials must sort through the conflicts, seeking to minimize
opposition, resistance, and generate agreement on which programs should
be cut, what process should be used, the revenues that can be applied to
the deficit, and steps to enhance efficiency.
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While local officials can almost always produce a logical rationale
for a particular package of cuts and revenue augmentation tactics, in
implementing a cutback strategy a different set of more vexing political
considerations emerges.
1. What are the immoveable fiscal and political constraints that limit
budget priorities?
2. Which groups are able to protect themselves from cuts and which are
more vulnerable to budget-cutting?
3. How can management maintain its authority while involving others in
the budget process?
4. How can revenue uncertainty be handled and new revenue options con-
sidered in the budget process?
5. How can efficiency and productivity be improved when declining re-
sources have a demoralizing effect on the workforce?
These considerations reflect the political realities that confront the
budget-maker: they will serve as the key questions to be examined in my
thesis. My interest is in the dynamics among the key actors: management,
elected officials, department heads, unions, and citizens. In the bud-
get process the chief executive or administrator is responsible for pro-
posing a budget and developing a cutback strategy. This spending plan
is typically reviewed and responded to by other actors--department heads,
elected officials--the City Council or Board of Selectmen, and citizen
advisory boards, and is often challenged by still other groups--unions,
neighborhood associations, and citizens. Conflicts emerge and necessitate
resolution.
Before analyzing the budget process used by local governments in
Massachusetts to respond to the tax cutting mandate of Proposition 21,
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some speculation as to the kinds of findings I expected to uncover might
be useful. Cutback budgeting places officials in the uncomfortable posi-
tion of having to make choices among different, but equally valued ser-
vices. Politicians must not only satisfy different constituencies (with
fewer resources), but seek to transform losses into gains through im-
proved efficiency, greater responsiveness to voters, or better coordina-
tion of decision-making. Thus I expected management to:
" minimize hostile reactions by avoiding lay-offs (i.e., cutting at
the margins and eliminating the programs with the weakest political
support.);
" centralize their budget authority to protect themselves from unexpect-
ed attacks and to maximize their control over the flow of information;
e invent new sources of revenue to avoid cutbacks and to win support
from key interest groups;
* promote productivity enhancement to demonstrate to voters that each tax
dollar is being stretched as far as possible.
In reaction to such moves by management, other interest groups could be
expected to:
* challenge the legitimacy of executive authority and seek greater in-
volvement in cutback and priority-setting decisions;
e protect certain programs from cutbacks by mobilizing political support;
* lobby for an additional share of whatever new revenues are generated.
Proposition 21 and the Case Studies
In Massachusetts, Proposition 21 passed in November, 1980, forcing
local governments to make substantial cuts in municipal spending. Larger
cities faced the prospect of 15 percent cuts annually for three or more
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years. This initiative pushed Massachusetts into the forefront of states
whose local governments faced revenue reductions, making it an appropriate
laboratory for an analysis of responses to retrenchment.
Proposition 21's most severe provision limits total local property
tax levies to 2.5 percent of full and fair cash value of taxable proper-
ty.(6) Localities with tax rates above this level are required to lower
their rates to the 2.5 percent limit or reduce levies by 15 percent an-
nually until the required limit is reached. Once the stipulated limit
is reached, tax levies may not increase by more than 2.5 percent annually.
No increases were permitted for growth in the property tax base, nor were
towns with tax rates less than 2.5 percent permitted higher increases.
For those communities which were not at full and fair cash value, revalua-
tion had to be completed within three years and could in some cases, lead
to a one-time increase in the property tax levy. Finally, Proposition 21
reduced the motor vehicle excise tax rate from $66 per $1000 of value to
$25 per $1000, a decrease of some 60 percent. (The excise tax is based
on state determined valuations, but is collected and retained by munici-
palities.) Voters were permitted to override Proposition 2j, but only by
a two-thirds vote in a local referendum held during a state-wide election.
Other sections of Proposition 2j modified statutory requirements
which purportedly contributed to high local expenditures. The law for-
bade the state to mandate programs imposing costs on local governments
unless the legislature also appropriates funds to cover such costs. In-
creases in county, special district, or special authority assessments on
municipalities were limited to no more than 4 percent. Proposition 21
also eliminated the fiscal autonomy of school committees; no longer were
local legislative bodies required to accept school budgets as presented
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to them by locally elected school committees. Finally, the law ended
binding arbitration for police officers and firefighters (enacted in a
comprehensive state collective bargaining law in 1974) designed to re-
solve intractable disputes and avoid strikes.
As part of the "Impact: 21" project at M.I.T., case studies of thir-
teen local governments in Massachusetts were conducted to learn how
communities facing large tax rollbacks went about the task of deciding
where and how to cut. The team set out to learn how Proposition 21 con-
strained budget-making in various municipalities; how local officials
attempted to preserve or cut particular programs and personnel; whether
and how power shifted in budget-making; and, finally how officials,
employees, and citizens viewed Proposition 21's immediate consequences.
Each case was written using the same basic outline of questions. A simi-
lar set of actors was interviewed in each case to develop a representative
set of local opinions. Interviews were conducted with local officials,
public employees, representatives of the poor and minority groups, neigh-
borhood activists, service providers, the press, and business spokesper-
sons.
For the purposes of this thesis, I will be relying on ten of the case
studies. I decided not to include three of the smallest towns because of
the small cutbacks they had to make. The case study sites were initially
chosen because the municipalities involved faced the prospect of large
revenue losses. As we shall see, revaluation and increased state aid
blunted the adverse impacts that might otherwise have been expected.
Throughout the thesis the experiences of the five case study cities will
be juxtaposed against the five case study towns highlighting the contrast
between the two types of local governments. The cities, for the most part,
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have highly centralized decision-making, with the mayors retaining much
of the control over the budget process. The towns, in contrast, are
highly decentralized with fragmented authority assigned to a variety of
different actors and boards. In addition, both the City of Cambridge
and the Town of Arlington employ strong managers and have incorporated
advanced budgeting techniques such as program and zero-based budgeting.
These provide a useful comparison with municipalities that have not
yet professionalized their local management to the same degree.
Basic demographic and expenditure data are provided on the following
page. The differences among the case study cities and towns are striking.
The cities lost population between 1970 and 1980 and typically had
higher per capita expenditure and tax rates. The shift in population has
been the result, in large part, of the movement of individuals and fami-
lies to the suburbs and outlying towns.(7) Arlington, the only town to
lose population, is an "inner" bedroom suburb of Boston with a highly
mobile citizenry. (8) The differences in expenditures among the cities and
towns is partially explained by higher infrastructure, transportation,
protective service, and maintenance costs associated with the older cities
in Massachusetts.
The case studies of cities and towns prepared by the "Impact 2J" pro-
ject all involved communities facing between 11 and 19 percent revenue
losses as a result of Proposition 2i. Table 2 on page details the
revenue losses faced by the case study communities. The cities, again,
have been the hardest hit by Proposition 2J. Columns one and two demon-
strate the potentially devestating consequences of the tax limitation
measure. The mandated property tax rollback is an approximation of the
tax revenue that will be lost. The percent tax rollback shows the number
INTRODUCTORY
TABLE 1
DATA FOR CASE STUDY COMMUNITIES
Place
CITIES
Cambridge
Chelsea
Quincy
Salem
Springfield
TOWNS
Arlington
Bridgewater
Burlington
Framingham
Marshfield
STATE AVERAGES
* % Residential:
Population
95,322
25,431
84,743
38,220
152,319
48,219
17,202
23,486
65,113
20,916
Resid. Prop.
Total Prop.
1970-1980
Population
Change
-10%
-17%
-3.6%
-5.7%
-7.0%
1970
Per
Capita
Income
$5,436
7,228
9,076
8,400
7,343
-10.0% 10,636
34.0% 9,850
6.8% 13,096
1.6% 10,604
37.0% 12,670
.8 increase 6,113
Tax Levy ($) 1980
Tax Levy 1980
Per
Capita
Exp.
1980
$1240
850
1220
1130
850
750
600
1070
829
860
$837
Actual
1981
Tax
Rate
$230
245
242
205
91
Effective
Tax %
Rate Residential*
62%
92
58
41
48
87 40 91
44 35 78
70 34 54
66 35 68
70 35 84
43.75
Source: Impact: 21 Data Base
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of years of 15 percent cuts that will have to be taken in order to fully
comply with the law. For Chelsea and Cambridge, this could possibly
mean four years of cutting. Quincy and Salem face two to three years of
15 percent cutbacks in property tax revenues. Although revaluation, state
aid, and the potential use of the override provision could reduce these
cuts to some extent,(9) the cities must confront the reality of cutbacks
beyond first year revenue losses. The towns in most cases would be able
to comply with the law by taking cuts in the first year. The motor vehi-
cle excise tax reduction combined with property tax cuts to give a first
year loss of revenue in column four. This figure is then taken as a per-
centage of total FY 81 appropriations to indicate the extent of the first
year revenue losses. These ranged from 11 to 19 percent.
Organization of the Thesis
The thesis is organized into seven chapters which roughly represent
the stages in the budget process. The first chapter presents an overview
of local government cutback strategies and discusses the setting of bud-
getary priorities and opening management positions. The second chapter
analyzes the negotiation tactics used to challenge proposed budget priori-
ties. These tactics will be evaluated with regard to their impact on the
goals of various groups and the community at-large. The third chapter
discusses the problems of finding additional revenue and improving effi-
ciency. The fourth chapter looks at the involvement of local legislative
bodies and their ability to review and respond to cuts proposed by power-
ful managers. Chapters five and six look at the allocation of additional
state aid and the final distributions of appropriations across places.
The final chapter discusses a range of proposals for improving the local
TABLE 2
REVENUE LOSSES FACED BY CASE STUDY COMMUNITIES
Mandated
Property
Tax
Rollback
Place $(millions)
Tax
Rollback*
(%)
Excise
Tax
Loss
$(millions)
Projected
First Year
Revenue
Loss
$(millions) %
CITIES
Cambridge
Chelsea
Quincy
Salem
Springfield
TOWNS
Arlington
Bridgewater
Burlington
Framingham
Marshfield
47.60
10.00
34.00
9.20
31.00
9.40
1.32
2.50
8.50
1.50
60
69
51
37
50
30
19
15
15
12.5
2.70
.40
1.60
1.00
3.17
1.50
.45
1.00
2.50
.70
14.60
2.57
11.6
4.73
12.47
12
17
11
11
11.5
6.2
1.49
3.5
11.0
2.2
*Tax Rollbacks: Prop. Tax Levy 1980 - (Equal. Valuation 1980 x .025)
Property Tax 1980
Source: Impact: 2J Data Base
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budgeting process.
The thesis I will seek to substantiate is that local governments
do not develop explicit strategies to cope with cutbacks. Rather, offi-
cials seek short-term strategies aimed at centralizing their control
therefore letting the budget process run its course. This course of ac-
tion protects politically sensitive groups from the weight of cuts and
shifts the burden of cutbacks onto weaker groups. There seems to be no
conscious effort to set criteria upon which budget priorities could be
set or to establish bottom-line measures of service quality and quantity.
This allows politically active groups to gain a greater share of avail-
able funds. Legislative bodies do not play much of a part in setting
budget priorities.
Public involvement and protest were limited in most cases, thus it
was difficult to determine if cuts represent community choices. Certain-
ly, another round of cuts made in a similar fashion will have devestating
effects on certain services.
A Final Caveat
It is not possible given the scope of this thesis to portray the
link between cutback strategy and outcomes as explicitly as I would like.
First, the available case studies focused on the cutback process, not on
outcomes. Even under the best of circumstances, it is difficult to iso-
late specific connections between strategies and outcomes. The cases
were based on only the first year experiences under Proposition 21--the
full set of impacts will not be clear for several years. Thus, my basic
concern is the budget process. I have sought to develop certain themes
that should lead to a greater understanding of cutback politics.
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I. SETTING BUDGET PRIORITIES: LOCAL GOVERNMENT CUTBACK STRATEGIES
IN RESPONSE TO PROPOSITION 21
This chapter analyzes the process by which key administrative per-
sonnel set budget priorities and developed cutback strategies in response
to reductions mandated by Propostion 22. In order to better characterize
these strategies, a brief theoretical framework is provided.
Cutback strategies are often not made explicit by management. By
analyzing the actions taken by local governments, I will try to charac-
terize their administrative actions. In a sense, proposed budget priori-
ties present management's opening position and set the stage for subse-
quent political bargaining. By and large, the goal for management in the
budget process is to minimize resistance and establish a strong bargaining
position from which to extract cuts from departments and lobby for addi-
tional state aid. Thus, setting budget priorities involves deliberate
political purpose. It establishes a baseline of cuts which demonstrate
the gravity of the fiscal "crisis" and provides an argument for increasing
the control that central authorities exercise in the budget process.
This chapter will seek to show that explicit cutback strategies were
not developed in the Massachusetts case study cities and towns due in
part to the lack of good information about spending within departments,
resistance from agencies and organized groups, revenue uncertainty, and
the desire to pursue political goals. Rational moves to enhance effi-
ciency were largely absent. Budget authority was centralized to reduce
conflict and to develop sufficient power to implement cuts. Priorities
that were set were justified by very general criteria.
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A. Theoretical Considerations
The recent literature on the politics of municipal budgeting enume-
rates various strategies that local governments use in periods of retrench-
ment. These "coping" strategies represent a range of responses available
to local officials including approaches to cutting expenditures as well
as approaches to boosting revenues. For the most part, the literature
describes managerial responses rather than the political dynamics of the
budgeting process. Cutback strategies often build around a central ration-
ale such as "cut the fat", "preserve future options", "minimize cutbacks
to mitigate the crisis", and "engage in an orderly process of programmed
termination".(10)
The choice of a cutback strategy usually hinges on a trade-off be-
tween equity and efficiency. The term equity is used interchangeably
with fairness to describe the distribution of services among individuals,
groups, and geographic areas.(11) Wildavsky has argued, however, that one
standard of equity should be the equality of results, seeking to show that
all groups will be affected in a similar way.(12) For purposes of the
analysis of cutback strategies, distributing cuts according to the equity
rule involves sharing the burdens so that all employees and services re-
ceive a cut proportional to the amount of revenues lost. (13) This type
of strategy usually involves an across-the-board reduction. One of the
political advantages of this strategy is that it avoids having to negoti-
ate cuts on a case-by-case basis or the need to evaluate services on a
department-by-department basis.
The other approach is to make cuts according to an efficiency analy-
sis. The term efficiency, as Schultze has pointed out, should not just
mean to produce more outputs for a given budget, but must be a measure of
-19-
the goods and services preferred by the citizenry. (14 It is not effi-
cient or does not make good economic sense to produce more goods and
services if those products are not desirable or in demand. For cutback
strategies, efficiency reflects cuts that are targeted to those depart-
ments in which unit costs can be reduced and still reflect the purpose of
local government.(15) This strategy requires budget-makers to prioritize
services and to conduct an analysis of the degree to which personnel and
other resources are utilized relative to their potential.
The trade-off between equity and efficiency exists when a manager
attempts to protect all current service types and levels, but in order to
be more efficient most disproportionately cut some services more deeply.
Thus, cutbacks pose a difficult dilemma: how to maintain existing ser-
vices and yet to target cuts in such a way to reduce costs and improve
productivity. In order to avoid losses in programs, the search for a
more efficient use of resources often leads to the search for productivi-
ty in non-personnel areas such as the use of energy conservation, centra-
lized purchasing, reorganizing department structures, and tighter fiscal
management practices. However, cutbacks on the magnitude of 10 to 20
percent inevitably require reductions in program and personnel. To con-
duct an efficiency analysis, the manager must be able to measure produc-
tivity and to measure this against community goals. Although techniques
for productivity enhancement have improved, hard services such as refuse
collection, street cleaning, and fire suppression are more measurable
than soft services such as education, health, parks and recreation, and
human services. The manager then, must be able to weigh the goals and
objectives of the community with an ability to determine where services
can be reduced to promote efficiency.
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In response to the problem of measuring performance, there has been
a tremendous growth since the 1960's in budgeting techniques such as
program based, management-by-objective, and zero-based budgeting sys-
tems.(16) These "rational" budgeting techniques, even if not used by a
majority of local governments, have spawned new attempts to establish a
more "objective" basis from which to measure effectiveness, efficiency,
and to a lesser extent--equity. (17) The two basic dimensions of produc-
tivity, efficiency (most often defined as output per person hour) and ef-
fectiveness (the degree to which objectives have been met) require that
objectives can be precisely defined and that services are selected which
have the highest cost-effectiveness ratio.(18) These budgeting systems
have been critiqued for attempting to provide a packaged or standardized
process by which to determine which services are expendable and to what
extent. Indeed, it has been said that these new budgeting practices often
build managerial authority and attempt to structure decision-making in
ways that remove politics and conflict from budgetary discussions. (19)
Some speculate that part of the reason that these techniques have not
been extensively incorporated into municipal budgeting is a lack of sensi-
tivity to the political and bargaining dynamics which are fundamental to
the budget process.(20)
While budgeting strategies can be categorized broadly as equity and
efficiency approaches, Levine, Rubin, and Wolohojian have identified five
which tend to be used in periods of retrenchment; incremental strategies,
windfall strategies, denial and delay strategies, stretching and resisting
strategies, and cutting and smoothing strategies.(21) The first two
involve the distribution of small or large amounts of revenue according to
pre-established commitments to organizations, projects, or coalitions of
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interest groups. The second three refer to attempts to handle revenue
losses. Denial and delay strategies include using more immediate means
to delay fiscal decisions until the revenue picture is firm and to use
short-term measures such as selling property or deferring expenditures to
delay actual budget-cutting decisions. Stretching and resisting strate-
gies reflect various responses to extend current resources and to prevent
deep cuts which ignite the antagonism of interest groups. Responses in
this category would be productivity improvements, management reorganiza-
tions, rationing services, cutbacks through attrition, and efforts to
regenerate the tax base. Cutting and smoothing strategies involve actual
lay-offs, termination of services, and re-opening labor contracts. A
clarification is made here between cutting and smoothing. The latter
being the administrative responses to ameliorate the negative aspects of
cuts such as the reallocation of staff and early retirement incentives,
whereas cutting reflects the actual reduction in jobs and services.
Levine's typology reflects a basic relationship: with greater reve-
nue losses come more drastic measures to cut expenditures. Further, the
more drastic the measures to cut budgets the more likely the responses
will develop resistance from interest groups. While this is an obvious
point, it represents one of the first attempts to integrate cutback stra-
tegies with the political problems faced by local officials. They made
no attempt, however, to look at ways these strategies might be used to
build a more comprehensive strategy to influence the extent of cutbacks
or to manage the internal demands from interest groups. For example,
efforts to "resist the decline" such as lobbying state officials and
reducing managerial costs can demonstrate to employees and interest
groups that all is being done to reduce the impact of cuts. This can
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help to reduce conflict and induce cooperation. In addition, most exa-
minations of cutback strategies rarely discuss the budget process of
methods of integrating cutabcks into the regular municipal budgeting
cycle. When cutback planning is addressed there is a strong leaning in
the literature toward a centralized process of "corporate strategy" to
improve leadership. (22)
Budget strategies can be differentiated not only by the substance
of the administrative activities involved but by the extent of participa-
tion. They can range from highly centralized closed-door approaches
with little public, employee, or client input, to much more decentralized
and open approaches. A decentralized budget process would be one based
on a representative goal-setting and prioritization process that solicits
input from citizens and clients, and uses employee recommendations to
improve service delivery and cut costs. A centralized approach is typi-
cally controlled by the mayor, chief administrative officer, or an
executive committee. It usually does not provide meaningful opportunities
for public or worker involvement and is based on establishing the budget
priorities at the executive level.
The development of a cutback strategy then, involves more than a
choice between equity and efficiency. The development of a more compre-
hensive, explicit strategy would involve 1) assessing the extent of reve-
nue loss, 2) carefully weighing actions aimed at improving efficiency,
3) reducing the impact of cuts on jobs and services, and 4) assessing
internal and external political and fiscal constraints on revenue and
expenditure decisions. The development of a cutback strategy means
choosing a process that will help to define the priorities and goals for
the community so the best course of action can be taken with public
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support. And finally, it means linking community preference and changing
needs to an assessment of organizational performance. The budget process
is a tool for decision-making and communication. As cutbacks force a
critical re-examination of budget priorities, linking planning and manage-
ment practices into a specific budget process provides a more sure basis
for coping with periods of retrenchment.
B. Opening Gambits (Proportional Cuts)
When Proposition 21 passed in November, 1980, the cities and towns
were in the midst of the initial stages of budget preparation for FY 1982.
Local officials were not ignorant of the consequences of the measure for
their municipality and were usually at the forefront of spokespersons
against the tax limitation initiative. Many felt that Proposition 2i
passed (most of the case study towns approved the measure by a 3 to 2
margin except Cambridge which soundly rejected it) because of an excessive
reliance on the property tax. Massachusetts cities and towns are limited
in their ability to raise revenues from other sources and depend on the
property tax for between 50 and 65 percent of their revenue.(20) Waste
in government was an issue, but most officials felt that state, not local
government was the primary target for the charge of inefficiency. Many
local officials felt they had been "nickel and diming" for years (the
result of a 4% tax cap imposed by the state in 1979) and that local
government is much more open to scrutiny by the citizenry. Rather, they
believed that voters wanted to send a message to the legislature to reduce
the size of the state government and to pressure for tax reform.
As a result of Proposition 2i, these communities had to figure in
first year revenue losses ranging from 11 to 19 percent. However, for
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local officials responsible for preparing the initial budget, the losses
were projected to have greater consequences than were originally feared.
Taking account for double-digit inflation, additional costs associated
with lay-offs such as unemployment compensation and early retirement,
legal obligations such as debt service, projections of program cutbacks
often soared to 25 to 30 percent. In Cambridge and Arlington, two commu-
nities with reputations for efficient and well-managed governments, the
managers were acutely aware that revenue losses were compounded by less
visible factors which often "eat up" real spending dollars. Given these
projections, local officials worked to build strategies that would accom-
plish the necessary cuts and deal with the prospect of future cuts. In-
deed, local officials believed that the first year cuts set the precedents
for budget cutting in future years, creating higher stakes to ensure a
successful budget process.
In reviewing the case studies a remarkably consistent pattern emerges;
in the beginning of the budget process most local officials attempted to
make across-the-board cuts. In justifying this strategy, most claimed
that it was an effort at equity, to "share the burden" and to maintain
well-known service priorities. The existing spending plan was justified
by officials as representing the types of programs citizens preferred be-
cause no-growth government due to inflation in past years had forced a
trimming to the bare bones. In all cases, the initial proportional stra-
tegy was accompanied by a hiring freeze and the use of attrition to pre-
vent lay-offs and maintain employees. As the tables on the following two
pages indicate, officials requested proportional cuts from departments
ranging from 12 to 25 percent. Although it was realized that some depart-
ments were more "essential" than others, the cuts added pressure to pro-
TABLE 3A: BUDGET CUTTING STRATEGIES (CITIES)
Formal
Authority
PLAN E - City Manager/
Council - Weak Mayor
Shifts in
Budget
Authority
Followed normal budget process
STRATEGY
Manager proposed worst case budget, cutting 25%. Request-
ed 17% cuts in all dopts. Imposed hiring freeze. Wanted
proportional cut between schools/city. Proceeded as if
no new revenues possible but requested raised user charges.
Listened to council priorities for police, fire. Used
performance based target.
The Mayor initially proposed proportional cuts at 20% butChelsea PLAN B - Strong Mayor Mayor controlled budget process, immediately prioritized to protect essential servicesWeak Council excluded Council (police, fire, sewer). Determined to target largest cut
in school dept. Pushed unions to open contracts, grant
concessions.
Quincy PLAN A - Strong Mayor/ Mayor supervised Mayor and Auditor wanted to maintain proportional cuts at
Council - (Can abolish and Delegated task to auditors 17% - yet big budgets had to absorb more. Targeted largest
create positions) cuts in schools. Cut less essential programs - such as
Mayor approves budget no recreation (22%), protecting public safety. Had "no
hire" policy for 2 years previous in city government.
Salem PLAN B - Strong Mayor/ Centralized all decisions with Mayor attempted to cut all depts. at 17%, combined with a
Weak Council consultant, planning dept. hiring freeze, and cutting of small, weak programs. Mayor
Excluded Council. showed a willingness to listen to union and public pres-
sure, to not cut public safety as deeply as other depts.
Springfield PLAN A - Strong Mayor/ Mayor controlled Mayor requested 11.5% cuts in all depts., even though
Weak Council Invited key business represen- there were indications (state aid) that the cut would not
tatives to advise be this severe. Used business committee to make recom-
mendations as to priorities, revenue measures and effi-
ciency. Targeted cuts in schools.
Place
Cambridge
TABLE 3B: BUDGET CUTTING STRATEGIES (TOWNS)
Formal
Authority
Strong town manager -
Selectmen - Fin. Comm.
Representative Town
Meeting
Shifts
in Budget
Authority
Executive level, ad hoc
committee formed late in
budget process
STRATEGY
Manager proposed budget cuts up to 25% - proportional and
eliminating weak programs - (Youth Center). Cuts proportional
between school & town. School Supt. prepared similar budget
with incremental cuts. Schools closed and sold for additional
revenues. Town used zero-based budget.
Bridgewater Selectmen, Advisory Selectmen gained influence The Selectmen attempted to impose 15% cuts on all depts. as
Board, School Comm. as the previous Adv. Comm. well as a hiring freeze and a ban on overtime. After the rni-
Open Town Meeting had quit. tial budget, they began to prioritize by protecting public
O Tsafety. They prevented a new advisory board from receiving
information until just before the town meeting.
4
Burlington Selectmen, Ways and Ad Hoc Committee met to make The Selectmen and advisory committee conflicted over whether
Means, School Supt., major budget decisions the cuts should be proportional or targeted. The Selectmen
Town Meeting. gathered an informal finance group to back their claim for tar-
geted cuts. They did not set explicit targets at the outset
in order to negotiate with depts. Ways and Means proceeded to
proportionalize cuts at 15% to recommend to town meeting.
a .n , Deep cuts were predicted without revaluation. Using revalua-Framingham Town administrator, Ad Hoc Committee centralized tinthconteeaemedoprotoaiealdps. t
elected boards, by the Fin. Comm. tion, the con.nittee attempted to proportionalize all depts. 
at
elete barsbythpFn.Co-.15%. This held true to the extent that small depts. could bear
tativecuts and to protect the police and fire depts. from large cuts.
Wanted a proportional cut between school/town.
After the town administrator quit, the Selectmen and AdvisoryMarshfield Selectmen, Advisory Selectmen and Advisory Board Bordeidtocmnefcsadtopoiiz srve.
Board.Board decided to combine forces ad to prioritize services.
Meeting. Services were ranked according to those legally obligated, es-
sential, and less essential services. They forecast an average
12% out which would be spread across all services according to
their criteria.
Place
Arlington
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duce additional cost saving measures, demonstrated that no department was
exempted from the cutting, and indicated what the cutabcks would be in
each department. Often the first budget was dubbed the "worst case sce-
nario", reflecting the most devestating consequences of proportional cuts
and demonstrating the gravity of the fiscal crisis, should the measure be
implemented as it stood.
It would be misleading to present the reductions originally proposed
as proportional across all expenditures. In fact, local governments es-
tablished a base which distinguished between fixed and discretionary bud-
get items. Typically the fixed base represents such items as energy,
legally obligated services and contracts, debt service, insurance, and
pension funding where a proportion of revenue (often up to 25%) must be set
aside to fulfill these "fixed items". However, there are no set criteria
by which a local government determines what will be classified as "fixed"
costs and this decision varied in the communities. In Burlington, for
example, garbage and street lighting were included in the fixed cost items
and protected from cuts. In Framingham, insurance, street lighting,
workmen's compensation, and pensions were seriously underfunded in order
to make it politically easier to add back these expenditures at a later
date. The town was willing to gamble that additional funds would be
found for these expenses in order to prevent large, and politically dif-
ficult cuts in the departments. They feared that if new funds became
available it would be easier to add in funds in fixed costs rather than
to re-open department budgets at a town meeting with the potential of re-
newed conflicts over line-item expenditures.
The consequence of setting aside a substantial proportion of the
budget as "fixed costs" at previous or increased funding levels concen-
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trates the majority of cuts on "discretionary" items. This means that
the total tax loss cuts come from direct services to the public. In
addition, the effort to proportionalize cuts is difficult to maintain be-
cause small departments often cannot handle the size of cuts that larger
departments can. Small departments such as the assessor, clerk, and
personnel, are often crippled by 15 to 20 percent cuts which mean the loss
of key employees in three to four person departments. Thus, primary cuts
must be focused on the larger and more visible budgets such as libraries,
education, police, fire, public works, and human services. And the
"worst case" budgets predicted these 25 to 30 percent cuts in these de-
partments.
There are not many differences between the initial strategies pro-
posed by the case study cities and towns. Each attempted to impose pro-
portional cuts on all departments and then to list the losses to be felt
by the community. In the cities and places where a strong executive
authority existed, the local governments were able to publish a fairly
precise list of lay-offs and program reductions. In Cambridge, Salem,
Quincy, Chelsea, and Arlington either a "worst case" budget was published
or a list of cuts was made public. There was strong speculation by de-
partment heads, local officials and other political observers who were
interviewed that the "worst case" budget would create maximum political
exposure for local officials and create pressure for increased state aid
and tax reform. Some believed that the budget set a bottom-line of cuts
which if restored would reflect favorably on local officials. Unions and
department heads saw the cuts as creating leverage to gain concessions
from union contracts, implement unfavorable departmental reorganizations,
and keep conflicts between departments to a minimum. Indeed, the strategy
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of publishing a worst case seemed effective in creating a crisis atmos-
phere, providing a strong mandate to negotiate cuts and implement reduc-
tions. Although the proportional strategy seemed to be based on a con-
cern for equity, because of the depth of the forecast reductions, it was
destined to engender disputes over what programs should be cut and at
what level. The actual measure of fairness in most cases was much less
obvious.
In some cases although the cuts appeared to be proportional, some
programs were selected for larger cuts or elimination. It seemed that
across-the-board cuts screened efforts to target some departments for lar-
ger cuts. Salem and Quincy proposed to cut some smaller programs alto-
gether and in addition to target the school department for larger reduc-
tions. Chelsea also wanted to extract greater cuts from the schools. In
fact, the school vs. town or city decision was divided quite evenly into
cities and towns. The towns voted to maintain existing spending propor-
tions for schools whereas, the cities attempted larger cuts. It is also
interesting to note that in the towns, the citizen advisory committee or
the finance committee wanted to maintain proportional cuts while the
selectmen advocated for targeting.
Arlington serves as a good case example of the opening strategy. To
determine specific reductions, the town manager asked department heads to
develop zero-based budgets (this was rare) whereby they ranked their pro-
grams and added the cost of each to arrive at the preferred budget. This
was the first year department heads had used the zero-based budgeting
procedure; previously, they had used a combination of performance-based
and management-by objective methods. Using the ranking process for the
1982 budget the Town Manager reviewed the department priorities and elimi-
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nated the lowest ranking programs to achieve the mandated 30 percent re-
duction. Based on this "worst case" scenario, severe cutbacks were
publicized, including lay-offs of 28 policemen, 25 firefighters, 150
school employees, 14 public works employees, 97 other town employees, and
the closing of a youth center. Except for lobbying for additional state
aid, the Town Manager did not discuss other revenue measures which could
be used to alleviate the "worst case" reductions.
Most local officials believed that voters were signalling the state
government to share the burden of the fiscal crisis with local governments
and to develop appropriate solutions for tax reform. For the Mayor of
Chelsea, the rationale for supporting Proposition 21 (one of the few local
officials to support it) was to create pressure from the localities for
tax reform and was determined to lobby the state for a more progressive
tax program. The Town Manager in Arlington polled residents to determine
if they supported increased state aid and a level-funding of the state
budget. (They did by a majority of 88 percent).
Consequently, he initiated a state-wide campaign in the 351 cities
and towns in Massachusetts to push legislators to increase state aid and
alleviate the fiscal pressures created by Proposition 21. In Cambridge,
too, the City Manager was heavily involved in lobbying the state for
changes in the law and additional state aid. He also proceeded to imple-
ment 21 as if no new revenues were possible.
C. The Problems of Targeting
The shift from proportional to targeted cuts can best be seen as the
attempt to implement cuts in the most politically feasible and discretion-
ary areas and to let political bargaining run its course. It seemed that
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many local officials knew they would not be able to maintain across-the-
board cuts, but the strategy gave an indication of what programs could be
targeted. Unless the existing distribution and level of services match
community priorities, the process of making selective cuts involves deve-
loping a set of new priorities and defending them. In the language of
cutback strategies this would mean carrying out an efficiency analysis.
At least in the first year, this seemed difficult to accomplish.
Marshfield was the only community which started the budget process
by targeting reductions in specific departments. They were also the only
community to develop cooperation between the Selectmen and the Citizen
Advisory Board to jointly review spending reductions. The town leaders
sent each department head a letter asking them:
1. What are the legally mandated functions in your department?
2. What are the essential functions which must be provided by your
department?
3. What other services does your department provide?
The letter also requested an organization chart of the departments, show-
ing which employees fell into each of the above three categories. All
mandated services constituted the first priority for funding, and all
"essential services" would be funded next, if possible. "Other services"
formed the category liable for reductions. Also requested was a schedule
of existing departmental fees.
Although this criteria for classifying services was useful, it proved
insufficient to reach the necessary level of cutabcks. Differences among
town departments caused the cutbacks to be made in different ways, with
different results in each. For example, the Department of Public Works
"took massive cuts.. .mainly out of materials, whereas, the Board of Health
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reduced its budget 32 percent, almost all in personnel." Small and labor
intensive departments whose work was indivisible were unable to absorb
substantial reductions without becoming inoperative. The town leaders
also found union contracts a problem:
Union contracts... set limitations on us.. .a lot of the kinds
of flexibility that we wanted to have, we could not have.
We could not re-combine jobs. We could not hold off on
steep raises. We could only eliminate a job. We could eli-
minate a whole department...but we couldn't eliminate half
of the recreation director and half of something else. These
limitations had more influence in building the budget than
they should have.
These problems were not atypical. In Salem, the Mayor had attempted
17 percent across-the-board cuts, but when departments did not cooperate
he tried to develop performance criteria to justify differential cuts. He
also wanted to totally eliminate funding for thirteen programs identified
as "non-essential". This effort proved frustrating. In the words of an
assistant to the Mayor:
In a sense there were no cost effective criteria. The cuts
were more politically determined--which areas were most
sensitive and what you could get away with. We had certain
constraints. We knew people wanted police and fire. We
were also aware of declining enrollment so schools were
cut fairly deeply.
At one point, we attempted to measure the effectiveness of
the fire and other departments, but it was held up by
politics. Performance criteria are difficult to do and
take a long time. Just try bucking a bureaucrat who's
been there 10 years. It's nearly impossible. So we went
through each budget, compared median salaries, the number of
personnel, salaries as a percentage of the budget total,
and then we made a subjective guess. The models are nice,
but the data just aren't there.
It becomes apparent in the process of targeting cuts that whatever ration-
ale is used is subject to the cooperation of department heads and other
parties to the budget process. In Cambridge and Arlington, the use of
performance and zero-based budget techniques helped to provide an indica-
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tion of department head priorities internal to each department but did
not provide adequate criteria for choosing among departments. One de-
partment head in Arlington argued that the zero-based budget was little
more than paper work which placed departments in a competitive rather than
cooperative, working arrangement. In an earlier effort to take the per-
formance budget seriously, this department head had attempted to establish
careful performance measures, but eliminated them upon discovering that
other department heads made no effort to follow through on performance
evaluation. The library head in Cambridge had argued that his department
was more efficient than others and should be cut less. The argument did
not hold as the manager was being told to protect public safety by the
City Council and it was difficult to compare efficiency across depart-
ments.
Without the use of efficiency criteria, the targeting strategy was
bolstered by a very general set of priorities. The rationale was to give
public safety top priority, cover your fixed costs, and protect employees
from lay-off s wherever possible. As one official said, "citizens want
the fires put out, the criminals arrested, and the garbage collected".
The Mayor in Chelsea laid out his budget priorities with the following
statement:
It is important to keep essential services. I kept as many
firemen and policemen as possible. We've already lost too
many police. We wanted to continue trash collection ser-
vice. We didn't want to close the library on Saturdays, and
the book mobile, or have less people on the fire alarm, but
the cuts have to come from somewhere.
Prioritizing seemed to represent a "back to basics" movement aimed at
protecting public health and safety. The effect of protecting public
safety from large cuts (police and fire departments make up between 12
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and 16 percent of a typical budget) was to leave a wide variety of local
government programs vulnerable to substantial cuts. Perhaps the most
susceptible to large cutbacks were the schools. With the loss of school
board autonomy, and justified by declining enrollments, many mayors found
they had a handy target for absorbing much of the loss created by Proposi-
tion 21. Since schools comprise approximately 40 to 50 percent of most
local government budgets, it was felt that they should take at least
that share of the losses. It was also believed that school budgets had
expanded faster than the city or town budgets. Public works were also
targeted, largely because personnel costs made up a smaller proportion of
their budgets and fewer lay-offs involved cuts. Parks and Recreation,
libraries, and human service agencies became primary targets for cuts as
these groups did not have well-organized constituencies or the general
public support which safety programs enjoyed.
D. Consolidating Budget Authority
In most of the case studies cutback budgeting produced a shift in
power relations toward a greater centralization of budgetary authority.
By itself, Proposition 21 enabled a centralization of management power by
ending fiscal autonomy for the school committee and binding arbitration
for police and firefighters. This section of the law seemed deliberately
designed to permit local officials the necessary authority to execute
the extensive cuts in the larger police, fire, and education budgets. In-
deed, for many local officials binding arbitration and school autonomy
were impediments to effective and efficient management, and the officials
had been pressing for their removal. In Chelsea and Arlington, binding
arbitration had been unsuccessfully challenged in the courts.
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However, even without the change in statutory powers granted by
Proposition 2j, it is safe to say that fewer people than usual partici-
pated in the annual budget process. Officials argued that uncertainty
over revenues, the number of department budgets that had to be examined
and the complexity of budget-cutting precluded widespread consultation.
In addition, it was feared that participation by a wide variety of groups
would increase the number of conflicts that budget officials had to han-
dle and delay the budget beyond mandatory deadlines. (The fiscal year
ends July 1). For most local officials, the budget-cutting process
severely strained the established budget process in several ways: many
new revenue assumptions had to be considered; department heads were sub-
mitting budgets late and without sufficient cuts; and differences over
priorities between other local officials plagued their ability to carry
out a normal budget cycle. These difficulties were adequate reason
according to many local officials to centralize budget authority and to
exclude most other groups from participating in setting budget priorities.
In the cities, where four of the five local governments are composed
of a strong mayor-weak council form of government, the budget process was
already executive centered. However, even though the Mayor has legal
responsibility for the budget, the mayors sought to enhance their control
by excluding the city councils from budget involvement and using advisors
and close department allies to set budget priorities. It was argued that
the large cutbacks required by Proposition 21 necessitated broader in-
volvement by other local officials and interested citizens because exist-
ing budget priorities were being substantially altered. In few cases did
the mayors extend participation to other elected officials and frequently
they did not submit a budget to the councils until extremely late in the
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budget process.
In the cities, strong examples of centralization were Chelsea,
Salem, and Quincy where the mayors retained much of the budget negotia-
tion in their offices with virtually no input from council. Even the
department heads, if they were not close allies of the mayor, did not have
much say over spending limits imposed on their departments. Defending
this approach to centralizing the budget process, the Mayor in Salem de-
clared that his was the "most objective perspective" as he was elected
to reduce conflict and provide strong executive leadership. Similarly,
the Mayor in Chelsea proclaimed:
I met with department heads, but it was centralized here
in this office. We did not have a citizen's committee.
Maybe I should have, but I heard from them. I knew what
they wanted. As far as the school department goes, I'd
like to have a line-item control. There should be one
person responsible. I'm given the responsibility; I
should have the control. Previously under the cap (4%
spending lid) the School Board overrode my recommenda-
tions and I had to go to court. Now they have to come to
me.
Town budget processes legally involve many more independent actors:
Town Manager/administrator, Advisory Board/Finance Committee, Board of
Selectmen, Town Meeting, as well as elected and appointed boards of semi-
independent commissions. Adherents to the town meeting form of government
are attracted by the strong appeal of the democratic process that gives
citizens direct authority over budget appropriations. As one town meeting
moderator argued, "204 town meeting members, elected from the neighbor-
hoods cannot be controlled or manipulated; nothing can be hidden." Critics
argue that the town form of government is too fragmented and doubt whether
it is sufficiently capable of dealing with the complexities of budgets and
increased urban problems. As an editor of a local newspaper commented:
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Town meeting does not get the information it should
have...with so many converging pressures, it is too
lethargic. Homework hasn't been done by the majority
and the Finance Committee does not do the studies or
propose ideas.
Others argue that town meetings are not as democratic as they might appear;
they are often controlled by officials or dominated by a few long-term
members. Others worry about excessive fragmentation of authority. A
local official in Marshfield ventured:
Marshfield is like an octopus...The difference between
an octopus and Marshfield is that at least an octopus
has a central brain to control its tentacles.
In a town like Arlington, local officials recognizing this problem opted
for a strong town manager form of government to reduce the extreme fragmen-
tation experienced by other towns. This means that the town manager has
the authority over spending in all town departments and makes appointments
to boards that oversee them. Still, the town faced substantial con-
flicts over roles and responsibilities to the point where critical deci-
sions were delayed until late in the budget process. Indeed, in most of
the towns, a key aspect of the budget process was the struggle to see
whose priorities would be incorporated into the final budget.
With so many actors, town officials sought to control budget informa-
tion and prevent endless negotiation. In three case study towns --
Arlington, Framingham, and Burlington, conflicts between the key actors
led to the formation of a more centralized, ad hoc committee made up of
key executives from major departments and elected officials. Such groups
often included the town manager, finance committee chair, a Selectman,
school superintendent, town accountant, and assessor. Faced with the
problem of not knowing what the final revenue figures would be, (state aid,
user charges, and revaluation figures were not established) these commit-
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tees often got together to agree upon bottom-line revenues and to consider
a set of budget priorities which could be recommended to town meeting.
Although these groups did not have formal authority, by virtue of repre-
senting powerful actors in the budget process they were able to resolve
conflicts and present a more unified administrative budget. In Framing-
ham, excessive fragmentation required that a coordinating group take
authority to develop a budget. In Marshfield and Bridgewater such coordi-
nation was not necessary. In Marshfield, the Finance committee and
Selectmen were able to agree at the outset to work together. In Bridge-
water, two Selectmen were able to dominate the budget process because
most of the previous year's Finance Committee had resigned and the two
tended to vote in the same direction.
Only in Cambridge did the normal working relationship continue be-
tween the major budget actors. The Manager drew up the budget and negoti-
ated with departments while the City Council focused on finding new reve-
nue sources. The Council believed that its role was to resolve conflicts
in the City Manager's budget if they appeared. There seemed to be a work-
ing relationship between the City Manager and Council as the Manager was
respected for his administrative expertise, and the Council for their un-
derstanding of neighborhood needs and citizen preferences.
E. The Game of Revenue Estimation
Developing an accurate picture of what revenues could be applied to
the first post-Proposition 2i budget was particularly troublesome for
local officials. Although the losses associated with the property tax
rollback and the motor vehicle excise tax reduction were clear, overall
revenues were less certain (because of state aid). Establishing
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a firm picture on the loss of revenues provides the basis for securing
the legitimacy cutbacks have. The failure to develop a firm revenue pic-
ture then, left officials vulnerable to requests by departments and other
interest groups for additional funds. Since the revenue picture was con-
stantly changing, the officials did not have a solid position from which
to reject proposed claims for funds. Thus in setting the cutback strate-
gy local officials had to both convince that the extent of the cuts was
real , but also show flexibility contingent on other sources of funds
becoming available.
There were a number of key variables which made projecting revenues
difficult: past budgeting practices and any surplus or deficits that had
to be covered, potential wage and contract settlements with employees,
fluctuating fixed costs and "uncontrollables" such as energy, the impact
of reduced credit ratings from Moody's and higher borrowing costs, the
loss of federal aid, the effect of efficiency measures, increased user
fees, state aid, and finally, revaluation of property values to full and
fair cash value. Using different assumptions, and factoring in the var-
iability in these revenue factors, a wide range of estimates could be
produced on which to base the budgets. However, few local governments
projected a set of alternative revenue pictures for deciding program
priorities and lay-offs at differing levels of revenue reductions. Even
though many of the above variables are encountered in any budgeting cycle,
under Proposition 21, the combination of federal aid cuts, higher borrow-
ing costs, the use of revaluation, pressure for increased state aid, the
degree to which user charges could be used, and the potential resistance
from public employees and unions increased the stakes and uncertainties.
In the initial stages of setting budgetary priorities, few officials
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in the case study cities and towns were able to predict what the final
revenue figures would be. Local officials coped with this problem in a
variety of ways. In Cambridge, the City Council appointed a citizen's
task force to explore all measures to increase revenues, their potential
impacts, and to report back to the Council and City Manager. By having
an outside group evaluate the revenue picture, it was believed that the
extent of cutbacks, when finally established, would have greater credibi-
lity. In the other four cities, the mayors consulted with advisors to
set approximate revenue figures and then to adjust the budgets as new
revenues became available. In these cities, the Mayors did not make pub-
lic their pursuit of new revenue measures until the end of the budget
process. Revaluation was not scheduled for completion in these cities
and was not a factor in the FY 82 budget.
In the towns, as was previously mentioned, ad hoc committees were
developed to reach consensus on revenues, although this often did not
happen until later in the budget process. In three of the towns, Marsh-
field, Burlington, and Framingham, revaluation was expected to increase
revenues but officials were unsure of how much. Coping with this uncer-
tainty, officials pursued a couple of different directions. Some decided
to gamble on new revenue estimates and others decided to wait until
revenues were finalized.
In Framingham, the use of the current equalized valuation figure
(EQV)* would have contributed to severe cuts. The executive administrator
of the town recalled..."the prospects of no revaluation were enough to
scare you.. .we projected cuts up to 40 percent in some departments." Faced
*The EQV is the state's estimate of increases in property value in each
town adjusted for inflation and other state factors.
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with the prospect of "worst case" reductions, the Finance Committee, the
Board of Assessors, and the Town Accountant agreed that it would be
reasonable to gamble on a new valuation figure of 1.5 Billion, a figure
that was judged to be fairly conservative and agreed to by the Department
of Revenue. Marshfield proceeded in a different direction, knowing that
some new revenue could be counted on from revaluation, but deciding that
revenues would not be applied to operating budgets until the funds were
in hand.
F. Summary of Findings
Most of the local governments reviewed in the case studies set about
to implement Proposition 21 according to established patterns in the
budget process. As budget-making in the first Proposition 21 budget was
infinitely more complex, it strained existing relationships and created
tensions between parties to the budget-making process. Shifts that did
occur were changes in power relations to centralize authority and protect
budget information. A variety of the administrative responses described
by Levine et. al., were in some way used by management to cope with cut-
backs. However, my analysis suggests the following points:
e Management did not provide a central rationale or problem definition
to guide the cutback process. Other actors were unclear as to the
direction and goals management would take to cope with the cutbacks.
* Explicit cutback strategies were not developed. The common response
was to argue for "equity" by proposing proportional cuts. The "worst
case", no new revenue tactic, seemed effective in applying pressure
on the state for additional aid and on unions to grant concessions.
* Shifting to selective cutting did not result from careful attempts to
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set priorities. Most governments did not believe they were "ineffi-
cient". It proved difficult to develop adequate performance criter-
ia. Departments were placed into a competitive position for funds.
There was a general fear that public safety was being substantially
threatened, and combined with the potential organized resistance from
organized labor unions in the police and fire departments, priorities
would be set by political bargaining.
* There was little attempt to develop a "shared view" on budget priori-
ties. Instead, centralization often meant excluding other groups.
Irresolvable conflicts were feared. Budget priorities were not tested
with the general public.
* Uncertainty over revenues made it difficult to reject claims for addi-
tional funds. This was one reason that new funds were not made public.
One town decided to "gamble" on new revenues to prevent "worst case"
losses. However, the possibility of new funds left officials suscep-
tible to challenges by organized interest groups.
The implications of this analysis are that local governments do not
engage in overall budget planning when faced with mandated reductions.
If this first year strategy is an indication of the long-run, cutbacks
will continue to be implemented haphazardly depending on the political
pressures that are expected.
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II. TACTICS TO RESIST CUTS
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the types of negotiation
tactics used by various actors to resist cutbacks. As the management bud-
get moves toward final passage, other groups enter to challenge the level
and types of proposed cutbacks. It is here where the assertion of the
cutback strategy and policy authority often come into direct conflict
with the long-term interests of employees, department administrators,
clients, and the general public who wish to protect jobs and services.
This chapter will focus on the following questions: how did groups res-
pond to cutbacks to either protect themselves from them or submit to them;
what types of tactics do different groups use; and, what are the implica-
tions of these tactics for the budgeting process and their impact on the
community. It will seek to show that certain groups have greater ability
to influence the budget process than others, cutbacks create serious con-
flicts internal to interest groups and between them, and for the most part
management has sufficient authority to thwart all forms of resistance.
Tactics refer to the specific actions and means that are taken to
accomplish the goals and objectives of each group. Obviously, the stra-
tegy for most groups targeted for cuts was to protect jobs and services
and to use appropriate tactics to accomplish this. Tactics can be viewed
on a continuum from cooperative to confrontational. On a broad basis,
cooperative tactics range from accepting a share of cuts to milder forms
of resistance which emphasize building a consensus among actors and to
utilize existing forums and grievance procedures to present positions.
More confrontational tactics involve taking a hard-line position and ask-
ing for more funds, visibly protesting cutbacks, threatening strikes and
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withdrawal of services, job actions, and legal suits. For actors who were
outside the formal decision-making process, there was little option but
to demonstrate against cuts with various forms of resistance.
A. Description of Tactics by Department Heads
One of the groups most involved with budget-cutting was department
heads. Many of these administrators have an intimate knowledge of the
workings of the city or town budgets and certainly a vested interest in
the outcomes of the cutback process in their department. Cutbacks place
department heads in a difficult position. If they appear to be cooperat-
ing with the cutbacks, they can create resentment among employees and
clients who do not see their supervisor's approach as defending their
right to exist. However, by resisting cutbacks they risk losing their
own jobs and damaging their relationship with the leadership. Often in
a period of cutbacks their authority is undermined, as elected officials
and citizen boards are charged with setting policy and priorities without
an intimate working knowledge of department budgets. This can be extreme-
ly frustrating as many department heads have spent years developing pro-
grams for which there is often little reward. Certainly then, the deci-
sion to cooperate with or resist cutbacks was an important and difficult
one.
1. Cooperation
A wide variety of department heads believed that they should be coop-
erative and take their "fair share" of the cuts. These administrators
were convinced that the cuts were real and that the proportional reduc-
tions that were requested should be complied with. Departments heads did
not believe it was fair to "be political" by lobbying elected officials
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and trying to swing constituencies to protect their services and to cut
others more deeply. As the director of a senior center said,
This year we took our cuts because we believed all depart-
ments would have to. The finance committee did an
excellent job trying to be fair, but... things changed
politically and it was out of their control. In the
future, once some of these cuts are felt.. .we will have
to become more political and with a strong senior lobby,
I'm not sure if that will be fair.
Many department heads did not see "becoming political", pressuring their
bosses and elected officials for more funds, as their role. Indeed, it
was reported that the department head's relationship to the budget offi-
cials was an important factor in determining the extent of cooperation.
In Springfield, only those department heads who were close to the Mayor
submitted budgets with the requested 11.5% cut. Others came in with vary-
ing cuts, attempting to bargain from a stronger position. Some believed
that by being cooperative they would not be cut too heavily. However, in
reflecting on their cooperative tactics, they believed that they were
"naive" and "missed the boat". It was "impossible to compete with fire
and police".
2. Delay and Ask for More
Many department heads believed that their department should be "an
exception to the rule" and that by resisting cust they stood a far better
chance of protecting their budgets. One of the easiest and most common
tactics was to submit budgets without the requested reduction. Budgets
would be received by management, especially from police and fire depart-
ments which would be level funded from the previous year. In Springfield,
Framingham, Quincy, Burlington, Bridgewater, and Salem, fire and police
department heads did not believe they should receive the same cuts as
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other department heads and complained vociferously when cuts were imposed.
In Framingham, for example, the fire department and Public Works depart-
ments did not provide information to budget officials until late in the
budget process, speculating on increased revenue and trying to avoid noti-
fication of lay-offs. By and large, requesting additional funds and de-
laying submission of the budget were not adequate tactics to protect jobs
and services. Stronger and more innovative tactics were needed.
3. Shift Internal Funding
Line-item control enabled many department heads the flexibility to
protect jobs or to place themselves in line for additional funds. Al-
though mayors and managers might have liked to make line-item cuts or
control where cuts were made, but allowing departments heads line-item
authority seemed to be a trade-off for imposing the depth of cuts that
were needed. Typically, management would set the bottom-line targets for
the department and then leave the line-item reduction to the department
head. As the Auditor in Quincy described,
We called in the department heads, explained the cuts, and
left it to them to make the specific line-item cuts. We
thought they knew their needs.
In some instances this discretion would enable department heads to make
cuts which would require requests for additional funds at a later date or
raise protest to mobilize appeals to the legislative groups. In Spring-
field, the Public Works head protected all jobs, but cut severely into the
maintenance and equipment budget, hoping to show his priorities to em-
ployees and depend on receiving an additional appropriation if a major
equipment failure occurred. In the Human Services Department, the direc-
tor ranked all private vendors as least important in an effort to protect
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staff and department programs. Outside agencies would be on their own to
apply pressure to the Mayor and City Council or to find other sources of
funds. In Bridgewater, the Police Chief did not want to make any lay-
offs and made cuts in programs that were important to the citizenry. By
cutting the Traffic Supervisors program he brought attention to cuts in
the Police Department and made direct appeals to the public through the
press in preparation for a major battle at Town Meeting. In a similar
move to cut the Traffic Supervisor program in Arlington, the Police Chief
learned that it was not so much the crime rate that was important but
citizen preferences. The storm of protest over the proposed cuts forced
him to shift his priorities to citizen complaint rather than patrol time.
In Marshfield, the Advisory Board was dissatisfied with the way some de-
partments made cuts,
We felt they made cuts in supplies in order to save people,
to the point that we don't know whether we are going to
have adequate equipment to deal with this next year.
4. Muster Political Support
It was obvious to the more assertive department heads, that unless
substantial support could be garnered their attempts to regain funds would
fall short. One of the quickest ways to build support was to threaten
the loss of vital programs. Departments with these programs had effec-
tive tools for mobilizing public opinion in their behalf. The Public
Works department in Framingham threatened to cut garbage collection ser-
vice if severe cuts were imposed on their departments. Similarly, a num-
ber of Fire Chiefs threatened to cut the ambulance service and demonstrated
that any reductions in staff would greatly impair public safety. In
Burlington, the Fire Chief along with the union collected 6,200 signatures
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(in a town of 23,000) on a petition to present to the Board of Selectmen.
There were numerous attempts to develop public support for positions
against cutbacks, but these were not normally the sole actions of depart-
ment heads; including employees and clients was an important prerequi-
site.
5. Claim New Revenue
Generating new revenues varied greatly between departments. Some
agencies had access to user charges and fees that others did not. Public
Works, for example, have access to water and sewer fees. In Framingham,
the head of the Public Works Board wanted to substantially raise these
fees and use the funds for expenses in his department. Other departments
that could raise funds in their departments believed that the additional
money should stay within their department and not go to the general fund.
6. Try Everything
When all else fails, department heads had to try stronger measures to
appeal for funds. Perhaps the best examples of this occurred in the
schools. For School Superintendents, faced with the first year of a loss
in fiscal autonomy, and new challenges to their budgets, being slated for
larger cuts than other departments created great resentment and animosity.
They believed that they were being forced to take the brunt of Proposition
21 and were being targeted as the "whipping boy". In response, School
Superintendents, often backed by their school committees, would attempt
to challenge the mayor's power to impose the cuts with the strongest forms
of resistance available to them. In Quincy, the Superintendent followed
a sequence of steps designed to confront decision-makers and mobilize
public support. First, he prepared extensive charts which compared city
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and school spending and listed his efficiency efforts to show the measures
he had taken to reduce education costs. These charts were used to appeal
directly to the Mayor to reverse his decision to cut a higher proportion
in the school budget. When this did not work, he took his case to the
press and involved parents and teachers in lobbying to prevent the cut-
backs. When this did not prove successful, the Superintendent filed a
lawsuit to protest the proportion of cuts and fiscal autonomy, but this
too, proved unsuccessful.
B. Description of Tactics by Unions and Users
Most of the local government public employee unions were involved in
attempting to persuade voters to reject Proposition 21. These unions of-
ten formed coalitions to show solidarity in their protest against losses
in quality education, threats to public safety, and reduced sanitation
services. However, after Proposition 2J passed, these coalitions dis-
solved as the unions preferred to negotiate separately against cutbacks.
In Arlington, a coalition of six unions attempted to stay together and
lobby during the budget process, but lack of agreement over tactics to be
used and common issues prevented its continuance.
In some localities, contracts had been finalized from previous years'
negotiations and would carry through the FY 82 budget year. In some
cases, management would attempt to re-open the contract to gain conces-
sions on wages and restrictive clauses such as overtime and minimum
manning provisions. In discussions on labor relations in many communities,
many union spokespersons had labeled relations with management as very
conflictual. This set a trend which carried over into current negotia-
tions. Union people believed that Proposition 2J gave management an upper
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hand to punish the unions and to keep wages low. Some had carried out
strikes and grievances in past years, and felt that cuts in their depart-
ments were more extreme because they had been active. In Bridgewater, the
Firefighters' union president said the cuts in the fire budget were poli-
tically motivated:
It's politics.. .The Selectmen had a vendetta against the
union. We've been active in town.
When public protest did occur, it was limited to objections to potential
losses in programs. There was no mention of protest regarding the overall
amount of cutbacks or how some services were being targeted for larger
reductions. Protest seemed to be most apparent in the cities although
local officials commented it was less than they expected. In Quincy, the
Mayor invited people to meet about budget issues but they didn't come,
although he received substantial numbers of telephone calls protesting
police, fire, and education cuts. The director of the local community ac-
tion program was frustrated by this:
People don't really go to the budget hearings. They
don't follow the issues. They only attend meetings
if their services or jobs will be cut. Not even the
elderly came out in large numbers. In spite of
Proposition 21, it was business as usual.
Officials in the towns said that most citizen protest was saved for town
meeting, and that town government has more avenues for citizens to be in-
volved. By stating this, the officials implied a belief that the public
trusts that decisions are made in their interests.
Unions and other interest groups did not have access to the variety
of tactics that department heads did. Little option was open to them
except various forms of visible protest, presentations at public hearings
and negotiating through the collective bargaining process. It seemed that
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the unions for the most part did not resort to stronger forms of protest
such as strikes and job actions. Most of the resistance was limited to
threats and presentations at budget hearings. However, there were a
number of tactics that were used to influence the level of cutbacks.
1. Cooperation
In view of the magnitude of cutbacks, a number of unions allowed
their contracts to be re-opened to protect jobs by reducing costs. The
President of the Firefighters Union in Chelsea believed that by being
cooperative with management, his department would be targeted for fewer
reductions. He also believed that this tactic would increase their abi-
lity to receive new funds should they become available.
If the Mayor had bargained in good faith he would have
saved a lot of money. Once he realized he was in trouble
with 21, he knew there had to be closer labor relations.
He supported 2J and wanted to end binding arbitration.
We felt that it was important to save jobs and since we
thought state aid was coming we went along with opening
our contract. We were the only labor group that cooperat-
ed. I hope some consideration will be given to us.
With this philosophy of cooperation, Chelsea Fire Fighters, in an unusual
move, re-opened their contract by offering a yearly loss of $1,000 in wages
to prevent job losses and reductions in fire coverage. Framingham Fire-
fighters reduced, not eliminated their minimum manning provision in order
to protect wage increases. Indeed, the Massachusetts Teacher Association
sent word to its locals to not get involved in local protest, hoping in-
stead to concentrate MTA efforts on tax reform and state-wide policy
changes. Marshfield teachers agreed to eliminate restrictions on per-
sonnel reorganization in an effort to help cut school department costs.
In addition, the Department of Public Works contract was re-opened to com-
bine two divisions, although this merger proved to be unworkable when a
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dispute broke out over the interpretation of contract language concerning
job classification in the combined division. A member of the Advisory
Board in Marshfield felt that there was greater cooperation in labor re-
lations this year but that power has shifted from the unions to the
town's management as a result of Proposition 21:
The union people are trying to save jobs, but they'll
compromise on hours now, whereas before 2i they
wouldn't compromise... .They will compromise...There
are too many compromises they have to make now, so
management does have the upper hand.
However, certainly not all unions agreed with re-opening contracts to ac-
commodate Proposition 2i cutbacks. One union leader in Salem insisted:
We said no chance. We're not taking a step backward for
the labor movement with 11 percent inflation. Once you
start going backwards--open the contract--you never stop.
Overtime is the real stickler. We have an agreement guar-
anteeing so many jobs for so many men each year... .we can't
run a department without full coverage.
The fire department president in Marshfield, wanted to see how negotia-
tions without binding arbitration would go, and believed that there was a
much stronger possibility of strikes in the future.
2. Present Alternative Cutback Plans
Although the tactic of presenting different plans for cutting back
department expenditures was only reported in one case, it was a unique
attempt to integrate labor and management relations. In Springfield,
teachers spent considerable time developing an alternative plan for making
the needed level of cuts. Their effort was to protect direct services to
students and maintain teaching positions. Their plan proposed redistrict-
ing, changing teacher assignments, and making cuts in supplies, after
school programs, and school busing. The plan was not seriously considered
in the current year by the School Superintendent.
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3. Public Presentations
Most union officials did make presentations at department hearings
held by legislative bodies and focused their remarks on the consequences
of the cuts on their department and the implications of the losses on
long-term community health and safety. The fire and police department
unions were much more active in hearings than other employee groups such
as library, public works, and clerical unions. The unions felt that the
budget was being developed without their involvement. Cuts in their
department budget created potential problems such as inadequate equip-
ment, losses in overtime pay, and safety questions which raised new is-
sues to be bargained over. They believed salaries were being set prior
to negotiations. Unions were not satisfied with the city's or town's pre-
sentation of their ability-to-pay as they could not verify potential
line-item cuts and the revenue figures proposed by management. Part of
their presentations made it clear that it was unfair for public employees
to absorb the impacts of Proposition 2J when they believed that manage-
ment did not make sufficient cuts among its own members. Union spokes-
persons said that the unions would be willing to endure cuts if manage-
ment would reduce the inequities between union and management salaries,
improve its own productivity, and cutback its own benefits. Thus, the
unions had to assert their involvement in the budget process by making
these presentations and were not requested to attend public hearings or
participate in the budget process.
A major tactical problem for the unions was whether or not the head
of their department went along with their demands and was willing to
defend them before the executive or legislative bodies. A useful con-
trast occurred in Framingham between the police and fire departments.
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The police chief believed that he should go along with the cuts and did
not see himself as a "political" person who protested the cuts--contrary
to the wishes of the union in his department which wanted to maintain
the existing funds. In response, the head of the police union felt there
was little he could do except to make presentations at budget hearings.
He saw that his position was crippled when it became clear that the police
chief did not accept his contention that the cuts would impair the police
department's functioning. The Fire Department chief and the union did
work together, lobbying local officials and appealing to the public to
prevent the cutbacks. Together with support from a strong statewide or-
ganization, hard bargaining, and by threatening the loss of important ser-
vices, they were successful in having cuts restored.
4. Protests and Demonstrations
It seemed that the unions for the most part did not resort to strong-
er forms of protest such as strikes and job actions. This may have been
due to the fact that strikes by public employees are illegal and that it
was not clear during budget negotiations what funds would be available for
collective bargaining settlements. The fire department employees in
Quincy did set up a picket at City Hall, but did not believe they should
go as far as to strike or take other job actions such as work-to-rule.
In Arlington, the President of the Public Works union saw that his union
could shut down the town (they had employees in school, maintenance, city
hall, etc.) but felt that it would be unproductive by creating unnecessary
antagonism with the town and unfavorable publicity with citizens.
One of the most visible forms of public protest took place in Salem
where citizens occupied a neighborhood fire station. The establishment
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of "People's Fire House Number 6" was part of a larger sequence of occu-
pations of police and fire stations in Eastern Massachusetts to demon-
strate citizen concern for threats to public safety. The Firefighters
union in Salem was also involved and strongly supported re-activating
the fire station and voiced its protest to both the Mayor and Fire Chief.
However, during budget negotiations, the leadership was unbending and the
fire station was never re-opened.
Another source of protest came from the business community in the
cities. In Springfield and Salem, business representatives voiced oppo-
sition to losses in the planning department. Since the business commu-
nity was involved in a variety of development projects which were being
run by the planning department and the Mayors, these objections were
directed at the City Councils which were threatening to cut programs close
to the Mayor's power. In Cambridge the business community protested the
possible use of payroll and professional service taxes which the City
Manager was considering as a measure to make up for lost revenues. Most
of the tactics used by the business groups were direct appeals by mem-
bers of large local firms and the Chamber of Commerce to the Mayors or
at City Council hearings.
A significant amount of protest occurred -over the loss of school pro-
grams and closings of schools. In Salem, the students themselves came
out to protest school cuts including sports, guidance counselors, and
classes. A walkout of 50 high school students in late winter led to a
rock-throwing incident and, ultimately, to negotiations with the Super-
intendent. Parents often protested the loss of transportation services
and cutbacks in traffic supervisors. This occurred in Salem, Quincy,
Cambridge, Arlington, and Framingham. In addition to Arlington, the
-56-
potential elimination of a youth counseling center drew large public sup-
port through letter writing and appeal at public hearings.
C. Criteria for Evaluating the Relative Merits of Tactics
The description of tactics used by various actors serves to point out
the ways that budget priorities are challenged. These tactics have var-
ious short-term and long run effects on local government and the communi-
ty. Most often, tactics to influence the municipal budgeting process are
divisive and set up competition among groups for funds. Without a well-
developed set of criteria and policies to evaluate requests for funds,
spending decisions are based primarily on the ability to pressure local
authorities to respond favorably to the particular positions of each
group. Decisions become based on what is politically expedient rather
than the overall goals and priorities of the community. The following
criteria are suggested for evaluating the merits of tactics used in the
budget process:
1. Success in staving off cuts in the short-run. For groups challenging
the priorities, the tactics are effective if they can prevent the
cuts from taking place or grant time to develop alternatives.
2. Impact on local government productivity and service quality. Dif-
ferent tactics can hamper or promote the ability of the organization
to carry out its work effort. One group's gain may be another pro-
gram's demise and damage the ability to develop ways to improve
efficiency.
3. Effect of tactics on the group's position in the community. Tactics
may reflect favorably or unfavorably on the group's relationship to
the community and affect the ability to muster political support for
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future positions.
4. Impact on the community's ability to meet overall goals and priorities.
Certainly, the ability to develop large scale support for a position
may promote community goals and priorities. However, tactics create
winners and losers and may change community priorities.
D. Analysis
These criteria develop a basis from which to analyze the tactics used
to challenge or to submit to the priorities set by management in the ini-
tial stage of the budget process. The tactics will be evaluated by the
types used by department heads, unions, and consumers and their implica-
tions for local government.
Most of the types of negotiation tactics that challenged the proposed
budget priorities used existing channels such as public hearings and bud-
get discussions with management. However, when direct appeals did not
appear to work, there were attempts to use other tactics to bring greater
pressure on management. Of the three groups--department heads, unions,
and citizens, department heads seemed to have the most influence over the
extent of cuts which would come out of their agencies. Through their
ability to use a variety of tactics--shifting resources within a budget,
raising revenues, and requesting additional funds in a direct relation-
ship with the leaders they could exert pressure for additional funds.
This ability seemed to vary between the towns and cities. In the towns,
there is less executive authority and department heads and groups could
appeal to a greater number of actors for funds. In Framingham, the use
of threatening tactics to withdraw essential services was effective in
persuading local officials to reinstate funds, at least for the short-term.
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However, in the cities, where negotiation tactics combined department
head resistance, union involvement, and citizens, the ability to protect
jobs and services from cuts becomes more evident.
The two more dramatic examples of resistance, the Superintendent's
in Quincy and the fire house occupation in Salem, showed that even when
there were strong demonstrations of support, the tactics were unsuccessful
at changing mayoral decisions. In Quincy, the Superintendent had pre-
pared an extensive analysis, involved citizens and filed a legal suit to
no avail. In Salem, the occupation of the fire station, the support of
the union and Fire Chief, did not change the decisions to close the sta-
tion. The implication of these two examples is that formal budget auth-
ority, when exercised, can thwart almost all forms of resistance. Cer-
tainly the executive must be willing to take the political ramifications
of the decision, but there may be other costs. Without methods and use
of effective dispute resolution procedures, stronger and potentially
more costly forms of resistance in strikes or dramatic public action may
be required by citizens and employees who disagree strongly with existing
priorities. As uniformed unions have said, with the loss of binding ar-
bitration, strikes may be their only tactic to resist further cuts in
their departments.
Department head tactics had a number of implications for future
spending. Cooperative tactics did not earn departments additional funds,
but may improve their position in the minds of local officials and the
community in the future. Local officials in Framingham expressed resent-
ment with the "strong arm" tactics of the Fire department and may target
it for greater cuts in the next round of the budget. Shifting internal
funds had potentially large ramifications. While the tactic seemed
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successful in preventing lay-offs of personnel in some cases, large reduc-
tions in equipment and supplies could require additional appropriations
and crisis spending. As cutbacks have all but eliminated the free cash
buffer that many local governments carry over from the previous year, the
need for additional funds could cause deficit spending or mid-year lay-
offs. Cutting low priority programs which were important to citizens
did seem effective in raising public protest, but sometimes it backfired.
Restoring programs such as the Traffic Supervisor services took funds away
from police patrol and equipment. The comment by the Police Chief in
Arlington is particularly astute. The impact of parent protest for rein-
stating guards to assist children across the streets was to shift communi-
ty priorities from reducing crime to the safety of young children.
In general, most of the tactics used to resist cutbacks by depart-
ment heads generated strong conflicts between departments, especially those
who were being slated for larger cuts. In Cambridge and Arlington, with
strong and respected managers who appoint the department heads, there was
less overt resistance to the manager's priorities. In Cambridge, the mana-
ger used additional revenues that became available from raising user
charges in specific departments to trade funds between departments and
reduce potential conflicts. Those departments that did not have the capa-
city to raise revenues were helped by those that did. Department heads
in other communities were asked by officials to determine which depart-
ments additional funds they were requesting would come from. In effect,
to make the trade-offs themselves. This was effective in reducing the
conflictual negotiation tactics that were used.
It was difficult for unions to develop a consensus position from with-
in because of internal conflicts. This made it difficult to build a solid
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set of tactics to challenge management. It was related by union officials
that cutbacks create conflicts between younger and older workers, and
between those with more or less seniority. Older employees depend upon
younger ones, especially in police and fire departments, to carry some of
the heavier loads, such as hauling hoses up ladders and continual night
duty. For younger officers seeking promotion, it is extremely frustrating
to spend significant amounts of time preparing for promotional exams only
to find that no positions are open. In addition, loss of workers meant
more work for those remaining. This outcome produces morale problems,
forces decisions between wages and employment, and creates job classifica-
tion issues by bumping workers and losing positions to attrition.
In Arlington, one union president said that the potential lay-offs
resulted in long union meetings to resolve resentments and conflicts be-
tween younger and older workers. Conflicts over pay and job security
became internal arguments among factions within the union, pitting em-
ployee against employee, and made it difficult to present a strong and
unified position against management cutbacks. In Quincy, the President of
an independent union which represented 1,000 city employees, felt that
binding arbitration gave an unfair advantage to uniformed employees.
While he believes that all public employee unions should have binding
arbitration, he feels that when only police and fire employees had it
they were able to take a disproportionately large slice of the municipal
pie.
The cooperative tactic by Chelsea Firefighters to take a $1,000 wage
concession was done in hopes of becoming first in line for additional
funds. This tactic was successful, as once state aid became available
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they were the first to receive the funds back plus a collective bargaining
settlement for a wage increase. most of the concessions and cooperative
tactics used by unions were aimed at maintaining the workforce and not at
improving productivity or service quality. Conflictual tactics used by a
variety of groups to resist cutbacks seemed to preclude attempts to im-
prove efficiency. Arlington unions, for example, were not convinced of
the town's stated financial position or cutbacks and efficiency measures
in management ranks and would therefore resist any attempts to negotiate
efficiency efforts with an existing or reduced workforce. Similarly,
management in the schools in Springfield was not receptive to a union plan
to cut the educational budget, ostensibly because it was a management
prerogative to make the budget cuts.
The lack of public involvement in the budget process is perhaps not
surprising and can be explained by a number of points. For the public,
minimal involvement in government affairs, as symbolized by declining
voter participation, could reflect a lack of concern about local govern-
ment priorities or frustration with public's ability to influence govern-
ment. It appeared that many citizens did not believe that cuts would
have a serious effect on local public services. Proposition 21 may have
served as a broad mandate for citizens showing "voters have spoken" and
it was up to local officials to implement the reductions. Second, there
is often a delay time for interest groups to get organized and plan tactics.
Finally, little public involvement may reflect the lack of meaningful
opportunities for citizen involvement in priority setting and participation
in planning. Often the lack of access and knowledge of the budget pro-
cesses is intimidating and prevents widespread public participation.
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E. Summary of Findings
Although citizen and union resistance was less than expected there
were substantial efforts to challenge budget priorities set by manage-
ment. Certainly, police and fire department unions and department heads
were the most active in protesting cutbacks. There was little protest
about library cuts, parks and recreation, and human services unless ser-
vices in these areas were targeted for elimination. The following points
emerged in the analysis of negotiation tactics:
e Management had the authority when it wished, even under substantial
citizen and union pressure, to implement its proposed cutbacks. There
was little citizens, unions, and department heads could to to change
specific reductions.
* In the towns with fragmented authority, groups were more capable of
appealing to other local officials for additional funds.
* Conflictual negotiation tactics impeded the discussion of productivity
improvements.
e Serious conflicts developed between departments and unions over the
types of political tactics used to garner additional funds. Political
lobbying in the first year promised more competition for funds in the
future.
o Successful protest to prevent short-run cuts was most effective when
threats to cut essential services were used.
e Cutbacks made it difficult to develop consensus positions within the
unions over tactics to enter the budget process.
* Line-item control of funds by department heads enabled them to protect
jobs at the risk of crisis spending for maintenance and equipment
needs.
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III. SEARCHING FOR REVENUE AND EFFICIENCY
Raising non-property tax revenues and reducing costs presented an
alternative to budget-cutting. Both of these options were explored to
some extent in the budget processes in each community, but the degree to
which they could be used to substantially blunt the extent of the tax
loss was doubted by local officials. This chapter will discuss the
nature of the revenue problem for local governments in Massachusetts. It
will look at the way in which new revenue options were explored, the
types of measures that were considered in the budget process, and prob-
lems in reducing "waste and inefficiency". It will show that munici-
palities in Massachusetts are severely constrained in their ability to
reduce their reliance on the property tax. Confusion over the legality
and appropriateness of revenue measures, state regulations, and union
contracts limited local ability to deal with the revenue loss. Local
officials delayed exploring revenue options and attempts to improve pro-
ductivity were more oriented to shifting and reducing services than im-
proving efficiency with the existing workforce. Thus, there were few at-
tempts to systematically consider both new revenue options and produc-
tivity measures.
A. Nature of the Problem
Local governments in Massachusetts have relied more heavily on the
property tax than anywhere else in the continental United States. In
Massachusetts, the property tax is 70 percent higher than the U.S. ave-
rage. The table on the following page indicates by revenue source, ave-
rage U.S. revenues and the average percent of revenues received by local
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government in Massachusetts. In Massachusetts, local governments rely
less on user charges, state aid, and other taxes for revenue. State res-
trictions on local taxing authority and mandated charges for state and
county activities have created an "over-reliance" on the property tax
for local financing. Payments for state mandated programs such as the
MBTA, MDS, and County programs have come largely from property tax reve-
nues.
Table 4
Major Sources of Local Revenue, Expressed as Percentages of Total Local
Revenue
REVENUE SOURCE U.S. AVERAGE MASSACHUSETTS
Property Tax 33.6% 54.6%
State Aid (from state 34.4% 25.5%
revenue)
Local Sales Tax 2.8%
Local Income Tax 1.9%
User Charges, Fees, Misc. 15.7% 9.3%
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Mass. Taxpayers Foundation, 1980
Thus, local officials are extremely concerned that they do not have
sufficient authority or options to support their public services. Reval-
uation promised a one-time infusion of new revenues as property values
were brought to full and fair market value. State aid remained the most
immediate and most important source of additional funds and was a continu-
ing political question. Federal aid cutbacks were expected but it was un-
known as to which revenue sources and by what amount. This left the in-
crease of user charges and fees, together with reducing local costs and
improving efficiency as the two primary local options to maintain services.
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Selling local government property and changing investment practices were
other options explored, but these and other local options seemed limited.
B. Investigating Revenue Options
Determining the level of revenues on which to base the budget was
one of the most critical questions facing budget makers. Many local offi-
cials believe they need to know the level of revenues available before
setting budget priorities and determining budget levels for departments.
The Proposition 21 "cap" resulted in a reversal of past budget processes.
Appropriations will be made in conformance with the total amount of avail-
able receipts, versus the past practice of setting the property tax levy
according to total local appropriations. Thus, Proposition 21 put the
local governments off balance as they had to seriously investigate the
revenue structure and set the budget level before legislative approval.
Coordinating revenue information and investigating new revenue op-
tions were major problems. Some expected that the current officials who
were responsible for revenue information--department heads, assessor,
treasurer, and budget-makers to set an accurate revenue figure given
the data they had available to them. However, each official was respon-
sible for particular pieces of the revenue picture and consolidating the
information required upper-level meetings to discuss revenue assumptions
and make projections. As reported, many local governments in the case
studies formed ad hoc committees to review revenue options. In two cases,
citizen committees were formed to search for new revenues. These commit-
tees, however, were often not formed until late in the budget process,
when the question about revenues was reaching a crisis point. It seemed
that the change in budgeting practices, the need to apply political pres-
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sure on the state to increase aid, and responsibility for coordinating
revenue information delayed making revenue decisions. In addition, pro-
tecting revenue information gave management the power to bargain effec-
tively with unions and other departments.
In Springfield, the City Council countered the Mayor's close rela-
tionship with business community representatives by developing its own
citizen budget committee to review options for new revenues and to build
the legitimacy of the Council's effort. The President of the Council
appointed prominent private citizens and members of the Council to pro-
mote a more active role for the Council and to review the Mayor's revenue
assumptions. The committee was effective in forcing the Mayor to include
the Council in its search for new revenue and their impact on the communi-
ty. In Cambridge, too, the City Council formed a citizen task force to
review all revenue options and propose new measures to deal with the defi-
cit created by the property tax loss. Although the City Manager saw this
effort as useful to involve citizens and to make a public report on reve-
nues, he saw it as limited.
Citizens cannot just come into local government and expect
to provide a comprehensive report on how to deal with the
revenue problem. Managing local government is a very
complex activity.
In Arlington, it was not until early May that a task force was formed to
deal with the revenue problem. A newly elected Selectmen believed that
the town was not doing all that it could to increase or use available
funds and proposed an executive level task force to investigate revenue
options and the reality of the number of lay-offs proposed by management.
By making a number of assumptions, such as using all of the town's free
cash, estimating state aid, and revenues from user charges and other
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accounts, he demonstrated it was possible to reduce the revenue loss by
over 65 percent.
C. User Charges and Fees
Re-evaluating and imposing new fees and user charges presented an op-
tion to cutbacks, but their impact was limited in the first year. Local
officials were uncertain as to the legaility and equity of imposing or
increasing certain charges. However, the importance of user charges and
fees may grow as municipalities attempt to bring their use more in line
with other states.
A limit was set by the state that user charges could not be used to
provide revenues for other local government services and could not exceed
the cost of the service for which the user charge was levied. A new sche-
dule for fees and charges was distributed by the state Department of
Revenue to guide local officials. In addition, there was considerable
confusion about whether or not expected revenues from new or increased
user charges could be allocated in the current fiscal year. Local offi-
cials did not believe they could accurately project the amount of revenues
that would be received from specific charges and it was risky including
them in the current revenue figures. A new state law (Chapter 30 of the
Massachusetts general laws) enabled communities to project additional re-
venues from increased fees and spend them as long as an adequate justifi-
cation was provided to the Department of Revenue that the revenue could
be expected. In addition, the law provided for the establishment of
revolving loan accounts so that local government departments could collect
their own fees and provide "earmarked" revenues for its own services.
Previously, charges and fees had to go to the general fund. Local offi-
-68-
cials were unclear however, as to how this new law was to be interpreted
and had trouble coordinating communication with the state to provide cla-
rification. As a result they were hesitant about their use of charges
and fees.
Local officials were also wary whether levying new charges in the
wake of widespread support for tax limitations was feasible. For commu-
nities with a sizeable poor population, designing equitable fees which are
sufficiently broad-based to provide significant revenues was difficult.
Some officials such as the Executive Administrator in Framingham believed
firmly that "users should pay for the service they use, and there should
be no free ride." However, others perceived the argument to be much more
complex. The Town Manager in Arlington believed that user charges should
not be set so high as to deprive needly people of an important service.
In addition, fees that are set too high encourage avoidance of payment.
Substituting user charges for taxes placed a greater burden on those fami-
lies who frequently use public services. As user charges are not deduc-
tible on the federal income tax, it is cheaper for the average homeowner
to pay for a service with taxes than with user charges. (23)
The Table on the following page provides a list of existing fees that
were increased and charges on new programs that were added. At the pre-
sent time, data is not available on how much each fee was raised and what
percent of the cut could be avoided by their use. With the exception of
water and sewer fee hikes, it seemed that big increases in fees and user
charges were not acceptable. Most communities established committees to
review overall fee schedules--many of which had not been revised for years,
but rarely was there a systematic effort to decide which services should
be targeted for user charges, the regressivity in specific fees, the
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Table 5: User Charges and New Fees
Community
Springfield
Increased Existing Fees
School Lunches
Adult Education fees
Public Works Services
Framingham
Arlington
Chelsea
Bridgewater
Quincy
Salem
Cambridge
School Lunches
Sewer Service
Town Licenses
Liquor Licenses
Water Service
Sewer Service
Oil Storage Fees
Water Service
Sewer Service
School Lunches
Public Works Services
City Service Fees
City Licenses
Police Permits
Parking Fines
Hospital Services
Water Service
City Permits
City Licenses
Water Service
Water Service
Sewer Service
Parking Fines
Sports Fees
Golf Course Fee
Hospital Services
Athletic Activities
Ambulance Service
Landfill Stickers
Athletic Activities
Subdivision Permits
Wetlands Permits
Zoning Hearing
Charge
Emergency Rescue
New Fees
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administrative costs of levying new charges, and ways to set prices.
Schools seemed to be a major target for new and increased fees. Some
worried that this was causing an unfair burden on families with kids in
schools as localities sought to end subsidization of lunches, and tack
on charges for athletic activities. Chelsea, one of the poorest commu-
nities in the state, attempted to shift to new sources of revenue in the
private sector by raising fees on oil storage tanks from $5,000 per year
to $100,000 but the legality of this increase was challenged by the oil
companies.
Cambridge, which made the most concerted effort to utilize increases
in fees, used the Citizen Task Force to evaluate the extent that they
could reduce property tax reliance by increasing user charges. By rais-
ing user charges and fees for licenses by over 35%, they were only able
to increase revenues by 0.8 percent to the city's general fund of $126
million. However, another group of charges, primarily from the local city
hospital, was projected to raise $5.9 million or approximately 4%, a
charge that was not available to most other communities.
D. Other Measures to Increase Revenues
Other actions to raise revenues or shift existing funds were utilized.
Three towns raised their revenues by selling town property. Arlington
sold two schools for $550,000 for development of condominiums and with
expected additional property tax revenues. Framingham also sold schools
while Bridgewater sold a house and a fire engine. Two communities modi-
fied traditional financial practices to provide additional revenues.
Arlington utilized all of its free cash against the recommendation of the
Finance Committee Chairman. He believed some buffer for unexpected funds
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was critical for the next year and that stripping free cash would prob-
ably create a deficit in the budget some time during the year. Burlington
also considered using its stabilization fund.
E. Improving Efficiency and Reducing Costs
Lowering the costs of services was a frequently expressed goal al-
though the extent that these efforts could significantly reduce the im-
pacts of Proposition 21 was doubted. The following table displays the
productivity measures mentioned by local officials. While many of these
were planned prior to Proposition 21, local officials agree that the new
law accelerated such efforts. This section will identify the types of
efficiency measures that were proposed or implemented and examine prob-
lems in attempting to improve efficiency.
Reorganization Finance Practices Changes
Consolidation and/or centralization - New purchasing practices, i.e.
of Human Service programs and Public joint purchasing with neigh-
Works services bor communities
- Consolidation of Schools - New Integrated Financial
- Schools and Fire Station Closings
- Job Reassignment, i.e., jobs
redefined, jobs reclassified,
jobs combined
- increased private contracting for
services, i.e., nursing, ambulance,
public works services
Management Systems
- Services made Self-Supporting,
i.e., hospitals, school lunch
programs, sewer services,
recreation services
Table 6: Efficiency Measures
In Cambridge, officials were able to implement a computerized finan-
cial management system which had long been resisted by agency heads. This
system was designed to standardize accounting procedures and produce
better financial reporting with less clerical and administrative time.
In a similar search for productivity improvements, the City Manager and
If
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Director of the Human Service Department were able to use Proposition 21
to further plans to consolidate various departments into one Human Ser-
vice Department. By sharing clerical, fiscal, and support functions, it
was estimated that approximately $100,000 could be saved annually. De-
partment heads feared that the new systems would reduce their control over
spending needs in their departments.
In Chelsea, the Mayor wanted to set up an outside contract for rub-
bish collection at a projected savings of $150,000, but decided against
it when he received no support from the City Council and the Union doubt-
ed his figures. In Quincy, Department of Public Works expenditures had
dropped by 47 percent in the past two years, partly the result of con-
tracting out. The landfill was closed in 1980, replaced by a contract
with a private firm that requires fees for commercial dumping, saving the
city approximately $400,000 a year. The ambulance service, formerly pro-
vided by the police is also on a private contract and eliminated 12 posi-
tions. Quincy also moved to make both its city hospital and junior col-
lege independent of the city's general fund, by establishing a revolving
account which enabled them to levy and gather their own fees and tuitions.
In addition to cutting and consolidating, Salem officials consi-
dered some new ways to fund and deliver service because of Proposition
21. The Salem Mayor emphasizes why he is interested in using contracting
and private sector initiative in government:
Government is costing too much money. I found in my
81 years in this office, that we can accomplish more
through outside contracting. The fringe benefits the
city pays are outstripping our ability to hire the
right people for the right jobs. The pension benefits
we pay are outrageous.
Salem contracts with a private firm to provide ambulance service. Although
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the practice is opposed by municipal unions, city administrators are look-
ing for other ways to involve the private sector. Part of the plan is to
have merchants in a new mall (funded in part by UDAG) to pick up some
of the "extras" such as holiday celebrations. They appeared willing to
cooperate. There were also proposals for merchants to take greater res-
ponsibility for lighting and security. The Director of the Chamber of
Commerce predicted that, in the future, the city may write service pro-
vision into its terms of agreement with new business developments. The
city is also initiating a cooperative purchasing arrangement with a
neighboring city and is seeking to use a police reserve force to cover
peak periods without hiring additional workers or paying overtime.
In Marshfield the reopening of the Department of Public Works con-
tract enabled a consolidation of divisions and reclassification of jobs.
The elimination of positions occurred across all grades, and using senior-
ity there was a bump of five lay-offs and four lost positions through
attrition. The department also considered eliminating townwide trash
collection, but the Selectmen advisory board, and a number of citizens
objected vehemently at a pre-town meeting. Framingham set up a committee
to look at the costs and benefits of contracting out trash collection,
but had to contend with a strong Public Works board and union. Arlington
had consolidated 25 independent departments into 6 major departments in
past years, but also set up a committee to review methods for improving
productivity, primarily in the area of computerized data and fiscal
management.
Local officials agree that the vote for Proposition 2l was a call
for more efficient government and there is little doubt that efforts to
improve productivity, eliminate waste, and reorganize departments will
-74-
continue. However, most local officials seem uncertain about what
future measures they can take. Efficiency measures are not obvious.
Quincy's establishment of revolving accounts involved already self-sup-
porting functions. In addition, implementing such measures will be as
difficult as identifying them in many cases.
Many of the efficiency measures discussed in the cases involved the
reorganization of job structures, shifting services to the private sec-
tor, and changes in the overtime and benefit packages to municipal em-
ployees. Although the strength of the union contracts vary, restrictions
in regard to contracting out, reduction in force, minimum manning, and
provisions which relate to the conditions and terms of employment limit
the choices open to management to improve efficiency. Hence, efficiency
will involve lengthy and difficult negotiations with unions. In addition,
many of the proposed efficiency efforts were attempts to reduce overall
costs and cutback on the extent of government services rather than to
improve productivity with the existing workforce. With the extent of
cutbacks required by Proposition 21, management was placed into a posi-
tion of having to find major areas to reduce costs quickly and as labor
costs are a primary expense, they are a major target of cost reduction
measures.
Another concern is that when it comes to cutting costs, executives
rarely reduce their own staffs, but tend to reorganize other departments
and make cuts in weaker agencies. A City Councillor in Quincy believed
that patronage prevented measures to cut waste and inefficiency,
Proposition 21 didn't guarantee that "fat" would be cut....
some important people were laid off but you'll still find
"fat". There's nothing in the law that says the Mayor has
to lay off his political appointees. Go down to the trea-
surer's office and you'll see less people there than in
the Mayor's office.
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A school official in Chelsea argued,
If some jobs in the front office were eliminated, I
know I could save some money. But these jobs are pro-
tected because the workers have been here a long
time. With computerization of payroll and account-
ing some savings could be made, but not enough to
reduce the real impact of Prop 21.
Charges of patronage and protection of administrative jobs and benefits
were commonplace in the case studies. During budget negotiations these
charges were difficult to verify. Legislative bodies and unions believed
that the unwillingness to share information on revenues and specific
line-item cuts indicated that patronage existed and cuts were being target-
ed to direct service workers.
F. Conclusion
Limitations on revenue options, the time factor involved with iden-
tifying and implementing productivity measures, and resistance from de-
partment heads and unions, combined to reduce the ability of local govern-
ments to replace lost property tax revenues. Efforts to investigate
local revenue options were delayed, ostensibly because the major variables,
revaluation and state aid were still unknown. However, delaying setting
budget priorities and protecting budget information seemed to be due to
a lack of responsibility for coordinating revenue information, a continu-
ing political focus to increase state aid, and to maintain a bargaining
position with unions. Options that were explored to improve efficiency
were small and created resentment and rumors of lay-offs from employees.
The formation of committees to investigate revenues seemed useful in
creating involvement by citizens and highlighted the difficulties in
developing local options to increase revenues. The task force In Arling-
ton was said to be a unique experience in cross-administrative coordina-
-76-
tion, the kind necessary to deal with the new complexities in agreeing on
revenue levels. This activity will be even more important in future bud-
gets as the "cap" on revenues will figure heavily on what services will
continue to be funded. In summary:
* Innovation will take time as shifts in local government services will
have to be negotiated and proposals to enhance productivity are deve-
loped. Productivity improvements will hinge on building cooperation
with unions and implementing a variety of measures throughout the
workforce.
* Local governments in Massachusetts have few options available to them
to reduce their reliance on the property tax. In order to maintain
existing services state measures in the form of aid or revenue
raising authority will be necessary.
* The early formation of committees to evaluate and predict revenue
levels seems to be an essential new ingredient in the budget process.
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IV. LEGISLATIVE APPROVAL: COURT OF LAST APPEAL
The final stage of the budget process was the submission of the bud-
get to the legislative body--the city council or the town meeting. The
challenge to management was to present a budget which reflected community
priorities and would be immune to subsequent challenges. For other actors,
department heads, unions, and citizens, this was a major opportunity to
reinstate funds by appealing to the elected officials and citizen repre-
sentatives. This chapter will test the proposition that legislative
bodies can alter the executive budget. It will seek to show that manage-
ment tried to maintain its prerogative in the budget process by not pro-
viding compromises and presenting the budget as a "closed book". For the
city councils, there was little they could do when budgets had been al-
ready substantially cut. The chapter will explore the political maneuver-
ing at the legislative hearings to determine what tactics and appeals
were successful in restoring funds or preventing further cuts. Attention
will be paid to previous conflicts and tactics in the budget process to
see how they were settled during passage of the budget.
A. The Art of Budget Balancing
Budget balancing, a requirement for local governments, can be looked
at in two ways: ensuring that revenues match expenditures, and balancing
the interests of the various parties to the budget. The first process is
a fiscal necessity, while the latter reflects more of a political neces-
sity. Taken together, they constitute the challenge to construct a set
of appropriations that can be supported by the available revenue and will
reflect the goals of the community. As many local officials stated,
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previous budgeting was based on incremental additions to each budget with
existing priorities staying in tact. One town moderator remarked, "we
used to go through each warrant article, vote on it, sum them up at the
end of town meetings and set the tax rate. Cutbacks, however, create a
whole new ball game." Potentially, the total basis of the budget could
be challenged as cutbacks forced a re-examination of priorities. Two
factors entered into the budget balancing process: uncertainty about
state aid continued to plague the ability to finalize a budget; and, the
trend toward budget centralization promoted control of priorities without
substantive input by citizen and elected bodies.
The predominant tactic used by the central budgetary authorities in
the presentation of the budget to the legislative body was to declare the
budget a "balanced budget" and to emphasize strongly "don't rock the
boat". The "closed book" approach was justified as necessary to maintain
the balance in terms of revenues and expenditures, but also because the
budgets were the product of many negotiations with department heads and
unions. Any tampering with the budget would open the process to new con-
flicts and it was feared that management would not be able to maintain its
pcakage of cuts.
B. City Councils--What's Left to Cut
The Mayors, recognizing the potential challenge to their budget pri-
orities, made substantial cuts and left little room for further cuts.
There was little the City Councils could do to shape overall priorities
and cutting more would only exacerbate conflicts over how much was being
reduced. A popular saying in Chelsea is "the Mayor proposes, and the
Council disposes." Thus, the relationship between the Mayors and City
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Councils in the budget process stayed pretty much the same as in other
years. However, the stakes were much higher this year as the Councils
were extremely frustrated by being excluded from priority setting. Of-
ten the Councils would resort to the media to call for open public
meetings to challenge the basis of the Mayor's priorities and revenue
figures. These meetings, if they did occur, often ended without resolu-
tion or agreement for involvement in the budget process before a budget
was submitted to them. And, as budgets were rarely submitted on the re-
quired date, the Councils had little time to review the budget proposal.
A Councillor in Quincy explained why the Council had very little to do
with this year's budget:
Quincy's type of government is "strong Mayor, weak Council".
The Mayor created the budget in consultation with depart-
ment heads. But we could only reduce the budget and not
add to it. This year, we voted for it as it was since it
had been cut so much already. We have no real control, but
we have to answer to complaints about the cuts.
In effect then, the City Council had to accept the Mayor's budget priori-
ties. They could not add to any accounts or shift funds to other depart-
ments.
Receiving the budget in late May, the Quincy City Council basically
accepted it in its completed form, but clashed over one major issue. The
Mayor had deleted funding for water and sewer services from the final bud-
get in an effort to create support for an independent water and sewer
commission with its own revolving account. This was an attempt to use the
budget document to create structural changes in city government. Some
Council members objected to joining issues of funding and structure of
services, and voted down the Mayor's proposal even though they actually
supported an independent commission. The rejection created a deficit that
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had to be alleviated with state funds.
In Chelsea, the Board of Aldermen (Council) received an initial set
of recommendations in early June, instead of the required March. The
Board's President argued that this year's budget hearings served little
purpose since the Board's work of reducing the budget had already been
accomplished by the Mayor. However, the Board was determined to make a
mark on the budget and committed a total of $195,000 in additional cuts.
$180,000 came out of unemployment compensation, $5,000 in college credit
allowances for firefighters, and $10,000 in fire department overtime.
One Alderman proposed reducing the Mayor's expense account but this was
not approved.
In Salem, the Mayor's budget contained a deficit of $500,000. Still,
the City Council, frustrated over the lack of a role they had played in
budget-making wanted to cut in the departments close to the Mayor. This
was a perfect example of how the exclusion in the budget process created
spiteful actions. The Council decided it would cut funds from the Legal,
Planning, and Engineering departments. Although data on cuts in the
Legal and Engineering departments is not available, the Council cut one
position in the Planning department which removed the Assistant Planner.
The department head claims this cut was vindictive as the Planner brought
in over $18 million in grants in a two year period and that his depart-
ment should not be punished for working with the Mayor on budget cuts.
However, this cut was carried out.
In Springfield, the Council passed the budget, in mid-June, virtually
unchanged. However, with some creative budget work they were able to
take some action in preserving some jobs they did not want cut. The
Council does have authority to abolish and create positions. After inten-
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sive lobbying by firefighters, the Council refused to abolish one entire
fire company as recommended by the Mayor and Fire Commissioners. By
abolishing positions and creating new ones at higher pay scales, the
Council provided "back door" raises for firefighters and other city em-
ployees and prevented the losses in their jobs.
Cambridge, again, was the only community in which the budget process
followed previous years' patterns. The City Council received a budget in
late March and had approximately 45 days to review the document. The
town took input from citizens and other interest groups as they evaluated
revenue recommendations proposed by the Citizen Budget Committee. By and
large, the Council followed the recommendations provided by the City Mana-
ger.
In the cities, the budgets proposed by the Mayors were maintained in
large part as they were submitted for legislative approval. Tactics that
City Councils had used to gain entry to the budget process at an earlier
stage were largely unsuccessful. This meant that other groups had to
rely on applying pressure and negotiating with the Mayors if they were to
be effective in escaping from cuts. The exclusion from the budget process
did bring retributional cuts as the Salem Council reduced departments
close to the Mayor's administration. Similarly, the lack of involvement
by other Councils seemed to create an incentive to make small adjustments
that might do long-term damage as a means to force the Mayors to work to-
gether.
C. Town Meeting--Court of Last Appeal
Town Meeting has the final authority over all expenditures in each
town. As such, Town Meeting must vote on each article of expenditure and
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is by design a mechanism to make adjustments in overall spending priori-
ties. For department heads, unions, and the public, using town meeting
as a means to make an appeal for additional funds is an important part
of the budget process. Here, the citizen advisory board (Finance Com-
mittee) to the Town Meeting reviews the budget developed by administrators
and Selectmen and presents a budget to Town Meeting members. Each article
is then debated until the budget is complete. It has been suggested in
this thesis that the "diffused" authority which accompanies the town
form of government is more susceptible to appeal by interest groups. Here
town citizens have the opportunity to evaluate the claims of different
groups and amend budgets accordingly.
The five case studies in the towns will now be summarized on a case-
by-case basis to explore how budgets were presented, what organized groups
were effective in changing the management budget, and the roles that
citizens felt they were able to play in the cutback process.
Arlington is a good example of how the "balanced budget" requirement
and top-level coordination can quickly and effectively move a budget
through the town meeting process. The Budget and Revenue Task Force
which had been set up in early May to resolve conflicts over revenues
and fiscal priorities completed its work shortly before town meeting.
Given the new revenue figures, the Town Manager and School Superintendent
had only two or three days to revise budget priorities. Within the week,
the Task Force sent a finalized budget to the Finance Committee. The
Finance Committee objected to the process--believing they had no role in
the budget development contrary to previous years and had little time to
review the budget. Their primary objection was that the Budget and
Revenue Task Force had taken away their role to investigate revenues and
-83-
spending priorities to recommend to Town Meeting. However, they passed
the budget on the strong recommendation of their Chairman.
Members of the Town Meeting voiced few objections to the substance
of the Proposition 21 budget. As the Finance Committee Chair led the
presentation, it was dramatically emphasized that the budget contained "no
slack", and that adjustments made at the Meeting in some departments
would create imbalances in others. Town Meeting members seemed to recog-
nize that the budget was the product of many negotiations and that higher
revenue figures than the "worst case" budget had eliminated major con-
flicts. The Town Moderator was relieved because he had feared that dis-
putes would be left to Town Meeting and "pandemonium would have ensued".
At the budget debate, there was considerable feeling on the part of Town
Meeting representatives that the budget had been "railroaded through".
While in the past, Town Meeting members had discussed line-item budget
issues, this year they considered only aggregate figures broken down into
programs and expenses. As a result of limiting the information to the
representatives, the Town Meeting process which usually takes about 25
sessions to pass a budget, only required 8 meetings.
In Framingham, the Town Meeting has generally gone along with the
Finance Committee's recommendations but it reacted differently this year.
Conflicts which had surfaced in budget negotiations erupted at Town Meet-
ing, contrary to wishes of management. Due to the late submission of
budgets, the Finance Committee gave Town Meeting members a set of 8
loose-leaf pages to represent their report whereas previously the Finance
Committee report was a 60 page budget document. The Chair of the Finance
Committee urged the representatives to accept their recommendations and
wait until the fall before attempting to restore funds that had been cut.
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Due to confusion over revaluation and state aid, no one objected until
the discussion began on the last warrant article. At this time the Fire
Chief and Fire Union President made passionate pleas to restore full
funding, accompanied by threats of reduced ambulance service and fire
protection. The Fire Chief had been resisting the Finance Committee
all along as had the Public Works Board, lobbying the Selectmen and de-
laying submission of their budget material. The Town Meeting then voted
to restore the department to full funding for the Fire Department and
thus opened the door to subsequent lobbying and debate by other depart-
ments. Department heads who had accepted cutbacks, then decided that
being competitive and political at Town Meeting was the key to more fund-
ing, and one lamented, "the can of worms was opened". The Chair of the
Public Works Board then got up and threatened to stop garbage collection
unless funds were restored in his department but his proposal was turned
down. However, after pressuring the Selectmen for a special Town meeting,
his funds were restored also. One Town Meeting member felt constrained
by the whole process and contended that:
No trade-offs or compromises were presented by the Finance
Committee....some of us would have liked to see the cuts
shared with Police and Fire, but this doesn't happen at
Town Meeting.
Bridgewater uses an open Town Meeting where all residents are invited
to come and vote on warrant articles. Here too, the Finance Committee
had only a week to review the entire budget. Indeed, the town meeting
was postponed until the end of June because of the complexity of the
budget-cutting process. Several departments were prepared for battles at
the Town Meeting. The Police Chief wanted to restore funds for positions
and overtime and the School Superintendent wanted to prevent further cuts.
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The Chief, making a long speech in defense of his funding requests was
asked to identify other budget items in other departments he would cut to
provide funds for his department. Taken by surprise by this, he had
second thoughts, and declined the opportunity. The School Department
budget was passed as presented. However, the School Superintendent was
worried that funds added to other departments would come out of his bud-
get. Soon after his budget was passed, the School Superintendent moved
to prevent changes in any budgets proposed by the Finance Committee. He
defended his motion by arguing that changing the budget at this time
would create conflicts among town departments. Since the meeting was
packed with teachers, his motion passed, and the budgets were made final.
Burlington is an example where local officials did not agree on bud-
get priorities and each group tried to use its authority to swing the
spending plan in its favor. The Ways and Means Committee (Town Meeting
Advisory Board) had advocated for proportional cuts. However, the Select-
men pre-empted this strategy by negotiating selective cuts in the depart-
ments. The department budgets went to the Committee in early May and
since its own proposal had not been followed, the Committee decided to
make some adjustments. It recommended full funding for school transpor-
tation and the Council on Aging's van driver, as well as the restoration
of funding for two Deputy Fire Chiefs. The Selectmen believed that new
revenues should not be allocated until they were in hand and recommended
against any new amendments to their budget. The Town Meeting went along
with the citizen committee's recommended budget. However, the Fire Chief
and Union were not satisfied with their funding level and presented the
6,200 signatures they had gathered to petition for full funding at the
1980 level. This request was rejected as the Town Meeting decided to go
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along with the Selectmen's recommendation to wait until an October meeting
when additional revenues would be confirmed.
In Marshfield, the joint effort in the budget-cutting process car-
ried through the Town Meeting. The Town Meeting passed the budget in
tact by recognizing the spirit of cooperation and sacrifice that had been
achieved. Unions, which had re-opened contracts in an effort to "share
the losses", did not present amendments at the Town Meeting. Budget
officials had held a preliminary Town Meeting six weeks earlier to allow
the public to air their concerns and listen to the leader's budget prior-
ities. There was, however, disagreement between some Selectmen and
members of the Advisory Board on the effect of Proposition 21 on "town
democracy". The Chairperson of the Advisory Board observed:
Proposition 2J did, perhaps irreparable damage to the
Town Meeting form of government. It took away the
right of citizens to determine how much money would
be spent, and where. By the time you limit the top
and cover all the mandated stuff, you're left with
very little to play with.... that was the damage of
21. It really changed the role of the citizen in
the Town Meeting.
However, a selectman disagreed. He believed that limiting citizens' con-
trol over the budget at Town Meeting would eliminate some of the "non-
sense", because Town Meeting was an inadequate forum for dealing with
complex budget issues. At Town Meeting it is usual that "all kinds of
special interest groups are able to stuff things into the budget after
they have been cut out." He maintained, that essential services were not
cut this year. He also believed that the biggest problem in government,
besides "overstaffing" was to press departments to define clearly what
they should be doing.
In the towns, the use of ad hoc committees to handle revenues and to
establish spending priorities were able for the most part to carry their
-87-
budgets through the Town Meetings. In reality there were few objections
to the substantive aspects of the budget. Only in Framingham were groups
able to convince the representatives to change management priorities. And
here, it was the result of strong threats by the department heads and
unions. In terms of process, members felt their influence over the bud-
get had markedly decreased. Conflicts in authority between citizen
groups, and elected officials and management were not resolved. Citizens
felt the budgets had been "railroaded through" and they did not have suf-
ficient time to evaluate budgets and make compromises between departments.
D. Summary of Findings
Certainly budgets are more complex this year: last minute decisions
were made on revenue figures and fiscal constraints limited the flexi-
bility to negotiate cuts between departments. Legislative bodies in the
towns had a greater ability to change budgets but management tried to pre-
vent it. By providing less information, not presenting trade-offs or
compromises for discussion, submitting budget priorities late to citizen
groups, and the need for a "balanced budget", management was effective in
sustaining its authority. The lack of substantive debate and changes in
the budget does seem to indicate support for the management's priorities.
In this analysis, the following points are important.
* Legislative groups do not play an effective role in cutback budgeting
and priority-setting. Part of this seems due to their place in the
budget structure, part to the power of management to control the
budget process.
* Citizens and elected officials need to be informed on the choices and
trade-offs in the cutback process in order to become an effective
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arbiter of disputes and to ensure that management priorities reflect
community preferences. Without this involvement, the potential for
vindictive cutting and conflictual relationships with management
becomes more evident.
4 Previous negotiation tactics used by groups to resist cuts primarily
with police, fire, and public works surfaced at legislative hearings
and some accommodation was made to their requests.
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V. ALLOCATING THE "WINDFALL" (STATE AID) AND PREVENTING DEEP CUTS
Once it became clear that state aid would be substantially increased
over previous years, the cities and towns prepared recommendations as to
how to spend it. Although the amount of state aid varied significantly
across communities, the additional infusion of revenues enabled the local
governments to refund certain programs and expenditures. Thus, the wind-
fall served as a unique test to determine spending priorities. This
chapter will examine how additional state aid was allocated. It will seek
to show that to a large extent, new funds would go to controversial cuts
where organized groups mobilized against reductions. These funds are then
used to appease interest groups and keep resistance to a minimum. In
addition, funds are used to stabalize municipal finances to begin efforts
to deal with future cuts or expenditures. This is important evidence that
local governments are planning for future fiscal problems. Finally, the
extent of the losses to each community will be summarized, identifying the
major which contributed to preventing the deep cuts that were originally
expected.
A. The Elusive State Aid
Setting the final budget was contingent on receiving a state aid figure.
This political battle at the state level carried the budget past the fiscal
year deadline of July 1st. Since state aid appeared to be larger than was
originally expected and was not finalized until late July, local govern-
ments had to cope with an unknown amount of additional funds. Local govern-
ments coped with this uncertainty in a variety of ways. In the cities, most
finalized an initial set of recommendations, with the prospect of an addi-
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tional hearing when the money became available. Arlington and Cambridge,
whose officials were active in the effort to increase state aid, had prior
knowledge of the formula that was being used and were able to opbtain "fairly
firm" estimates of the funds that they would receive. Arlington passed two
budgets, one with an estimate of state aid, the other without state aid. A
special Town Meeting would be called in September to confirm the state aid.
Cambridge's City Council decided it should prepare a package of funding
recommendations to prevent groups from requesting funds for all kinds of
purposes at Council hearings. Other towns, Framingham, Marshfield, and
Burlington, had both state aid and propsective funds from revalution to
figure into the budget. These towns completed a budget before July lst, but
called for special town meetings in the fall to appropriate additional
funds and to send out estimated tax bills.
The tables on the following two pages indicate the amount of state aid
received and the percent of the FY 82 revenue loss replaced. Only two com-
munities, Chelsea and Bridgewater, recovered the full extent of their first
year revenue losses from state aid. The rest received between 13 and 30
percent of their losses in increase state funds. The Town Manager in Arl-
ington was incensed by the unequal distribution in state aid, and filed a
bill through his state senator to rectify it. He wanted all communities to
receive between 30 and 60 poercent of their losses back from the state.
His campaign to rally local communities to pressure for increased state
aid fell short of the amount of aid he believed local governments deserved.
The bill, although favorably received was not acceptable to the Governor,
who had committed the increased aid to communities as part of his total bud-
get package and was not about to change it.
TABLE 7A: FINAL CUTS* AND ADDITIONAL REVENUE
CITIES
Place
Preli-
minary
Cut
Reval/A in
Prop Tax
Levy
Cambridge 12% Not
14.6m Completed
State Aid
% loss
$ / replaced
2.34m - 13%
Final Cut
$ / %_ EXPLANATION AND PRIORITIES FOR NEW REVENUES
The increase in user fees (5.9m) largely from hospital service charges
202m - (2%) and water and service fees, combined with some management reform(human services) reduced the overall loss in revenues to 2%. Addition-
al state aid went to schools, fire, police dept., rent control, libra-
ries and to a lesser extent public works and human services.
17% Not
(2.57m) Completed
2.66m - 98% 0.23m - (2%) Chelsea received almost its total loss as a result of 21 back in addi-tional state aid. Increased user charges - .5m were also factored in.
Initial cuts in fire (min. manning and overtime) were restored. Police,
public works equipment, city employees, some school cuts restored.
Additional free cash and surplus held over for next year.
The city budget was approved with a $6m deficit which had to be made up
(incy 12% Not 3.76m - 30% 10.54m - (11%) with state aid, 3.7m and 3m of increased Leceipts at the city hospital.
(11.6) Completed This left only .5m for budget redistribution which was used to rehire
laid off employees in police and fire departments.
Salem received 21% of its loss in state aid. The combination of signi-Salem 11% Scheduled 1.2m - 21% 3.89m - (9.1%) ficant lay-offs and program losses were not blunted by the state aid.
(4.73) FY 83 The Council and the mayor used the state aid to replace a deficit of
500,000, refund transportation, street lighting, and police salaries.
Springfield 11.5% Not 8m - 15% 2.2m - 1.6% The raising of user fees, improved collection of taxes, cash manage-Sompeted-1ncreas1 e ment and a budget surplus from the previous year enabled a modest
Completed increase increase in the Springfield budget. The state aid was used to restore
cuts in fire department, rehiring school personnel, salary raises for
collective bargaining settlement and refund street lighting
reductions.
* These figures do not factor in
the % indicates.
inflation, costs from lay-offs and all user fees. In many cases the loss will be greater than
Chelsea
TABLE 7B: FINAL CUTS AND ADDITIONAL REVENUE
TOWNS
Place
Preli-
minary
Cut
Reval/a in
Prop Tax
Levy
Arlington 16% Will com-
6.2m plete in
FY 83
State Aid
% loss
$ / replaced
1.4m - 28%
Final Cut
2.5 - (6.3%)
EXPLANATION AND PRIORITIES FOR NEW REVENUES
Arlington developed two budgets which prepared for eventual
state aid. The use of 3.7m in free cash, the reduction of
full costs and the increase of user charges reduced the full
extent of the loss to 2.5m. The additional state aid was
designated for school salaries, pension system and town
raises in collective bargaining.
State aid almost completely replaced the losses the town in-
Bridgewater 15% Not 1.47m - 99% 1.02 - (.01%) curred. With the additional aid the town used it to rehire
police, fire and other salaries as well as some fixed costs
and a small amount for a stabilization fund.
Burlington 13% 701m - 860m 0.58m - 16% 292m -14.6% The town received state aid and an increase of 2.6m over theg 3.5m 2.6m i- inrem 0 minitial FY 82 limit. Of the additional 2.6m only $718,000
3.5m 2.6m in- increase went into operating budgets. The rest went to stabilize
crea intown financies - for reserve funds and finance capital exp.
Prop Tax of the $718,000 - 650,000 went to schools, and police and
FY 82 Levy' fire departments.
Framingham gambled (correctly) on a new valuation figure. In
Framingham 19% 1.3B - 1.5B 1.7m - 20% 6m - (9.1%) their budget they included a deficit of 1.2m in insurance,
Expected Sm unemployment compensation, and street lighting which would be
increase in added back when state aid or higher valuation was finalized.
prop x Additional state aid of 1.7m took care of these "fixed costs".
Marshfield 12% 354m - 484m 0.84 - 27% 1.94m - (10.2%) Revaluation provided a higher valuation than expected. With
2.4m an additional shot of state aid,.8m, the town distributedAmount roughly $500,000 among the schools, police and fire depart-
Unknown ments.
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B. Allocating the "Windfall"
There seemed to be three general trends to allocating the additional
funds: restore as many cuts as possible, fund those programs and groups
who have protested, and save it for next year to prepare for more cuts or
stabalize government finances. A number of factors seemed to influence
these choices. First, the amount of state aid enabled some communties the
flexibility to refund the cuts programs. For those communties that faced
more years of cutting, saving funds to alleviate the severity of the next
year losses was essential. Second, there were some fears that the wage
freezes that had been imposed would provoke strikes by organized employees
if they did not receive a share of the funds. Withough binding arbitration
police and fire fighters were prepared to bargain heavily for wage increases.
In fact, Chelsea fire fighters and other unions had gambled on a share of
the new "kitty". And third, controversial cuts in school bus transportation,
street lighting, and traffic supervisors were refunded to reduce the resis-
tance from groups who had lobbied local officials.
Cambridge reached agreement on additions to the budget and sent the
recommendations to the City Manager, following the general priorities out-
lined by him. Cambridge spread its state aid funds across a variety of
programs in an attempt to maintain equity in its cutbacks. Officials rein-
stated some school cuts, resotred positions in the fire and police depart-
ments, kept a library branch open and sent smaller sums to other departments.
Their final loss was much less than expected, reducing a "worst case" loss
of 25 percent to a 2 percent cutback.
Chelsea and Bridgewater used the funds to restore as many cuts as
possible. They both received almost all of their losses from state aid.
Bridgewater spent most of its funds for fire and police salaries, as well
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as funds for fixed costs in highways and legal expenses and additional funds
for a stablization fund. Chelsea attempted to restore a wide variety of
cuts, but also to combine some of the funds that it had with a surplus that
was generated the year before for a stablization fund.. Chelsea was facing
two to three more years of cutting. However, in Chelsea, streets, libraries,
and schools still received substantial reductions.
In Quincy and Salem, the additional funds had to go to deficits existing
in the operating budgets. What little was left went to refund some of the
controversial losses--school bus transportation, police and fire salaries,
and smaller amounts for other employee salary raises. Springfield also
funded some salary raises and restored all street lighting after protest
from neighborhood associations.
Arlington, in the development of the two budgets, left increases in
funding to go to three sources: maintain a fully funded pension system,
prevent lay-offs of teachers, and raises for collective bargaining with the
town's seven unions. Each union was given a three percent raise and a two
percent increment which would be negotiated. Some union members (police and
fire) felt they should be able to bargain for a share of the total amount
(500,000) of the funds allocated for raises. However, the town saw that
giving all a 3 percent raise as an attempt to preseve equity in the bar-
gaining process.
For the three towns which completed revaluation, state aid helped to
reduce overall losses or to overcome any losses at all. In Framingham,
the combination of revaluation and state aid reduced its losses by over
one-third. It had substantially underfunded its fixed costs and was able
to add them back with new state aid. In Marshfield, however, revaluation
was expected to bring in additional funds, but these were not allocated in
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the FY 82 budget. The state aid that did come in was distributed among the
schools, police, and fire departments. Burlington, where revaluation was
scheduled for completion later in the year, proceeded throughout the budget
process as if no revenues would be forthcoming and would only allocate funds
if they were finalized. Thus, when revaluation netted 2.6 million and state
aid, $580,000, the town found itself with a substantial increase (14.6%),
not cutbacks as had originally been feared. However, the town still cut
funds in its departments and used the additional funds for a reserve and
future capital expenditures.
C. Summarizing the Losses
In summary, there were five major factors which accounted for the "sof-
tening" of Proposition 2 1/2's first year impacts. The two most significant
factors were revaluation and state aid. Three other factors contributed to
preventing "worst case" losses: raising user fees and charges, postponing
capital expenditures, and reducing labor costs through attrition and con-
tract concessions. However, the actual extent to which these latter factors
blunted the effects has not been calculated. Another factor which often
was not publicized or considered was a free cash surplus generated from
investments or unnecessary appropriations.
Thus, local officials managed to prevent the deep cuts which had been
predicted and feared. The final cuts as shown on Tables 7a and 7b demon-
strate that cuts ranged from an increase in Burlington, to decreases of 10
and 11 percent. Salem, Quincy, and Frmaingham (even with revaluation) were
the hardest hit of the case study communities in terms of the final dollar
amount lost. Salem and Quincy face two or more years of cutting in the
future. It should also be remembered that data on final cuts reflects the
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actual dollar losses. Increases in "fixed costs", inflation, and borrowing
costs, those that drove up estimates to the "worst case" figures of 25 to
30 percent can make the impact of these percentage losses much greater.
The losses were quite variable. Cambridge and Chelsea each took a 2 per-
cent loss. Springfield had a 1.6 percent increase due to a previous budget
surplus. Arlington and Marshfield took between 6 and 10 percent cuts,
although Marshfield did receive an amount (not available at this time) from
revaluation.
D. Summary of Findings
The purpose of this brief chapter has been to examine the types of
responses local government exhibit with a "windfall" in a cutback period.
Generally, although the amounts of aid varied as well as the financial
predicament of each community, the "windfall" went to pre-established
"commitments" such as groups who had resisted cuts or negotiated an agree-
ment to be first-in-line when funds became available. There were a few
attempts to promote equity by distributing state aid as widely as possible,
but by and large funds went to salries to the existing workforce--primarily
police and fire. Data was not available to do a more rigorous comparison
of the allocation with the state aid. Certainly for most of the communities,
state aid was not what it was hoped to be. Other factors, revaluation, the
use of user fees and charges, and contract concessions helped to lower the
losses, but there were still significant cuts felt in the communities.
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VI. TRENDS IN MUNICIPAL APPROPRIATIONS AND FUTURE CONCERNS
The final link in the budget process is to examine the distribution
of cuts among departments. As the cutback strategy shifted from propor-
tional cuts to targeted cuts, and resistance from organized sectors in fire,
police, and public works became apparent, it seemed that most cuts were
forced into "softer" services. This chapter will examine whether or not
cuts were unequally distributed and to what extent, what services were
eliminated as part of the cuback strategy, and final losses in per capita
expenditures across communities. It will confirm that weaker, less organ-
ized services took the brunt of the cuts. Finally, a section is included
on some of the concerns that local officials had about the effects of
Proposition 2 1/2. It provides a basis from which to understand the con-
cluding remarks in the final chapter.
A. Trends in Municipal Appropriations
Table 8 on the following page confirms what became evident in setting
budget prioriteis and negotiations: greater percentage changes occurred
in education, libraries, parks and recreation, and street services. These
services declined by an average of 9.5 percent in education, 13 percent in
libraries, 18.4 percent in parks and recreation and 17.6 percent in street
services. When compared to the overall drop in municipal expenditures in
the case study communities--3.5 percent, these reduction are quite large.
In addition, contrasting the declines with the "harder" services it be-
comes apparent that "softer" services bore the greater burden of cutbacks.
Police department services declined by an average 2 percent, fire services
actually increased by .2 percent, and garbage collection had an even
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greater increase of 10.1 percent, although the latter is quite variable
among places. While the difference in cutbacks is not surprising, the
overall extent of the difference is when most local officials had started
out by attempting to impose proportional cuts.
TABLE 8
CITIES
PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN MUNICIPAL APPROPRIATIONS
(FY81-FY82)
Education
Police
Fire
Streets
Parks
Garbage
Libraries
Debt
Total
TOWNS
Education
Police
Fire
Streets
Parks
Garbage
Libraries
Debt
Total
Cambridge Chelsea
-4.0 -4.8
0.2 4.0
0.2 7.4
-7.0 -15.9
* -1.0
* -6.0
-6.0 -19.5
9.0 -1.9
-2.0 -1.5
Arlington
-5.2
-5.0
3.6
-14.5
-11.2
-2.3
-20.0
-2.3
-6.3
Framingham
-9.7
1.7
-1.8
14.0
-6.7
-6.2
-15.0
-13.0
-9.5
Quincy
-19.6
-8.2
-6.8
-67.7
-23.7
21.9
-23.1
-1.5
-11.0
Salem
-15.7
-1.6
-8.2
-37.1
-34.6
-17.0
-16.0
-4.6
-9.1
Springfield
-5.0
0.2
-5.5
-12.5
-12.0
1.7
-6.0
5.9
1.6
Burlington Marshfield
-8.5 -9.0
0.0 -10.4
9.4 0.7
* *
-8.0 -49.9
10.1 12.3
-3.6 -6.6
-1.3 39.9
14.6 -8.4
(Bridgewater data
is not available)
-99-
The following table takes the shift to cuts in "softer" services one
step further and shows that education, parks, and libraries bore a dispro-
portionate share of the total cuts. This table compares education's share
of the total cuts to its share of the FY 81 appropriations for seven of
the ten communities. In arlington, Framingham, and Marshfield, the educa-
tional reduction was proportional. In Burlington and Chelsea, the decrease
was larger. In Quincy and Salem, the reduction was significantly greater
than its percentage of FY 81 appropriations. In libraries and parks,
the decreases were again larger than their FY 81 budget percentages, but
here the dollar amounts were much smaller.
Percent.Munici al FY.82
Schools Percent of FY 81 Appropriations Apropria tion Reduction
Arlington
Burlington
Chelsea
Framingham
Marshfield
Quincy
Salem
Libraries
Burlington
Chelsea
Framingham
Marshfield
Quincy
41 percent
51 percent
51 percent
46 percent
52 percent
43 percent
33 percent
0.7 percent
0.2 percent
1.0 percent
0.9 percent
0.1 percent
34 percent
214 percent
161 percent
47 percent
56 percent
62 percent
57 percent
0.8 percent
25.0 percent
2.0 percent
0.7 percent
2.3 percent
TABLE 9
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Percent.Municipal 82
Parks and Recreation Percent of FY 81 Appropriations Appropriation Reduc.
Burlington 1.6 percent 4.2 percent
Chelsea 2.0 percent 1.3 percent
Framingham 0.8 percent 0.6 percent
Marshfield 0.3 percent 2.0 percent
Quincy 1.0 percent 2.4 percent
Salem 2.0 percent 9.0 percent
Thus, the large difference between "soft" and "hard" services can
be explained by a number of factors which became evident as the budgets
were negotiated and finalized. Obviously, local officials made public
safety their first priority. Some of the local governments had been
slowly reducing their fire and police departments to a level which they
believed was a bare minimum. However, many local officials also felt that
since the public safety budgets make-up between 12 and 16 percent of their
budgets, that some of the cutbacks would have to come from these depart-
ments. The fact that the fire department and to a lesser extent the
police departments took strong and combative stances during budget nego-
tiations was certainly a factor in preventing cuts. Clearly, police and
fire departments had a measure of support and influence that other union-
ized employees did not have.
Garbarge collection, also highly unionized was an issue in some
municipalities, where its reduction or elimination was used to threaten
management to continue its service at current levels. With rising costs,
it is obvious why local officials are looking to contract out this ser-
vice. Since garbage collection is a service which affects all citizens
and when not maintained is a highly visible problem it also became a
sensitive area.
Department heads in the "softer" services felt that when pitted against
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public safety, they couldn't compete with public sentiment and the union's
tactics. In the cities, there was less support for education and human
service programs. This trend to have the burden of cuts fall on less
supported programs would be hard to change. There was evidence of mobiliz-
ing support for libraries, especially when a branch was slated for closure,
but this was not widespread. The lack of efficiency criteria and measure
for an "adequate" level of public safety did not provide a basis on which
to determine the level of fire and police services needed. Cuts were made
from perceptions and the need to protect political positions.
Table 10 summarizes the services that were eliminated in the
case study communities. Perhaps because most localities did not suffer
large revenue losses, the elimination of programs was the least used cut-
back strategy. Only Salem, which faced significant tax rollbacks, actually
terminated city funding for several city departments. However, they were
attempting to get the private sector to pick up some of the programs.
Schools, in their attempt to protect direct services to students attempted
to cut those programs which were not central to classroom services. In
cases where these programs were not cut they were often subjected to new
user charges to maintain them. Most of the types of services that were
eliminated were related to arts and cultural activities and community
relations services.
TABLE 10 SERVICES ELIMINATED
Springfield New school textbook purchases, private street maintenance,
city landfill service, spring clean-up.
Chelsea Evaluation program for special education.
Cambridge Community Relations service.
Salem Funding for Christmas decoration, parades, concerts,
Cultural Arts Commission, Fireman's Memorial, Heritage
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TABLE 10 Cont'd SERVICES ELIMINATED
Salem Cont'd Celebration, Historical Commission, Human Rights Comm-
ission, Tourist Commission, Waterways Commission, and
Departments of Weights and Measures.
Quincy High school drama, junior high athletics.
Burlington Some high school electives and some courses with small
enrollments.
Framingham School public information services.
Marshfield Police beach patrols and winter cottage checks.
Bridgewater School programs in art, music, home economics, industrial
arts, summer recreation, and trash pick-up.
Since local officials used hiring freezes and attrition to smooth the
reductions, attrition was primarily responsible for the reduction of posi-
tions in the departments other than schools. Although complete data ia
not available, it appeared that lay-offs occurred more often in the cities.
Those places facing the smallest budget reductions could make almost all
of their personnel cuts through attrition. Second, school departments
suffered many more lay-offs than police, fire, or other municipal depart-
ments. In the long-run, of course, attrition has the same consequences
for services as lay-offs. In fact, many department heads were even more
distressed about the impact of attrition in their departments. For example,
the Police Chief in Arlington reported losing a captain and three patrolmen
to early retirement and job changes. He believed that the attrition policy
caused a real loss in management and patrol time. He would have liked to
have reduced the traffic supervisors program in order to make cuts. Thus,
the attrition policy created disproportionate and less controlled losses
in many departments.
Finally, per capita changes in appropriations best suggest the actual
dollar losses to local goverments across places. Table 11 on the next page
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summarizes per capita changes in appropriations.between FY 81 and FY 82.
TABLE 11 PER CAPITA CHANGES IN APPROPRIATIONS
Cambridge 1 2 $Ch ge Arlington F 21 2 $Chggge
Chelsea 590 582 -8 Bridgewater Not Available
Quincy 910 786 -124 Burlington 1114 1091 -23
Salem 1122 1020 -102 Framingham 893 809 -84
Springfield 873 888 +15 Marshfield 898 823 -55
It is difficult to generalize or develop trends about spending among places
because of the number of variables which entered into the budget-cutting
process. It is still evident that Quincy, Salem, and Framingham were the
hardest hit. Cambridge, even though it did not receive much from state aid
(13 percent of its loss) was able to increase user charges and other funds
to make up most of its loss. Arlington, too, had forecast large losses,
but used free case and state aid to reduct the impact. Since state aid,
revaluation, and user charges affected each community differently, compar-
isons between cities and towns does not yield signigicant results. However,
each of the cities faced the prospect of future 15 percent cuts under
Proposition 2 1/2, whereas the towns through revalution were able to con-
tain most of their losses in the first year.
B. Future Concerns
Comparing municipalities, there can be little doubt that city officials
forecast a much bleaker future than their counterparts in the towns. Even
in Framingham and Arlington, which suffered above average reductions in
appropriations, local officials seem to believe that the worst is over,
that revaluation, coupled with management reforms and a state guarantee to
provide local assistance would prevent long-term damage. Perhaps, because
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all the cities face another year of property tax levy reductions as well
as federal budget cuts, their officials fear the worst. As one related,
I fear next year. This year, we had seventeen vacancies in
the police department -- next year, we won't. This year we
cut over 10 million, but we have fixed costs as well. We
already transferred the junior college and the hospital out
of the general fund budget. We cut the library by 50 percent,
So, where's the room?
Another official claimed,
After the second cut, the city would be no longer operational.
You're not an existing community after something like that.
You might as well dissolve as a corporate entity.
Clearly, another round of cuts, if implemented in the same way as the
first year cuts would render many of the departments inoperable. As a
school official in Chelsea argued,
Look at it this way -- next year if we have to cut 15 percent,
that will be another $900,000. Figuring that 5 people cost
roughly $100,000, we will lose 45 teachers. At that point,
and certainly with a third year of 15 percent cuts, I believe
we should close the doors and go hom, because morale will be
too low. Students and parents in Chelsea want a quality
education. They want a band. They want athletic teams to be
bused to the games. But they don't want to -- and often
can't pay for it.
Local officials are not only concerned about future local cuts, and
the consequences of deferring capital expenditures, but are worried about
federal cutbacks. The extent and impact of federal funding losses is
another major unknown. Losses in federal revenue sharing, CETA, community
development, and human service funds were feared to potentially exacerbate
the cuts that were already taking place in the communities. The director
of a suburban human service agency predicted,
Human services are taking it on the chin. The problems have
notbecome evident yet, but they will. The difficulty is that
out clients do not speak for themselves. Besides the compe-
titive nature of obtaining scarce funds, there will be more
demands for services as financial problems worsen -- housing
shortabes, fixed incomes not keeping up with inflation,
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Medicare cuts, etc. There will not be enough staff to meet
these needs.
Most communities did not factor in state and federal cutbacks in services
in their budget. This was partly the result that these losses were not
confirmed, but also because the communities were financially incapable
of picking up the losses. In Sprinfgield, the local United Way made it
clear that it was not their responsibility to pick-up the additional funds
needed in the wake of federal cutbacks.
Although difficult to confirm, there was widespread speculation on
the "winners" and "losers" as a result of the Proposition 2 1/2 budgets.
The editor of a Chelsea newspaper said,
Beneficiaries will be the taxpayers who were burdened by
the public employees. The losers will be the public
employees. Their demands can't be endless.
However, as the massive lay-offs that were predicted earlier failed to
materialize, union officials believe that similar relief will be found in
the future and lay-offs will continue to be avoided. The City Manager in
Cambridge feels that this supposition is both inaccurate and short-sighted:
The concept of municipal finance is nebulous to most public
employees. They think I have a bag of money in my drawer.
Others believed that with revaluation and shifts in the state tax struc-
ture that taxpayers will not receive the benefits they expected, leading
to additional protest. In fact, with revaluation each community has its
share of taxpayers whoo will owe more taxes after revaluation, despite
Proposition 2 1/2. A member of a citizen organization said,
2 1/2 will just increase state taxes like the sales tax,
which is a burden on middle and low income families. That with
the cuts by Reagan, will mean poor and working people will be
hurt more. People were hurt by 2 1/2. Property tax relief
will be minimal, and the money has to come from somewhere.
Many people agree that because of deep school cutbacks, young people will
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suffer most. A City Council member in Salem said,
The dust hasn't settled yet. But I think the young people
are the losers. Parks and recreation got the most devastating
cuts. Youth services were badly hurt, and of course, educa-
tion. Youth who don't vote, will be hurt the most.
Low income and elderly constituents believe they will be the victims of
Proposition 2 1/2, and that federal and state reductions in the services
they use will add to their problems. While there were many projections
on the impacts of Proposition 2 1/2, few communities carried out a syste-
matic analysis of the implications of their cutbacks on various individuals
and groups. More were concerned about the precarious financial position
that Proposition 2 1/2 left them in.
Many believed that an over-reliance on the property tax must be changed,
but were frustrated that changes in that direction were not taking place
at the state leve. Local officials did not feel it was right for a state
law to impose spending limits on local government. Cambridge formed a coal-
ition into a state political action committee to pass Cambridge's home rule
or local override petitions. They also wanted to form alliances with
citizens in other oommunities to pass override measures. The Mayor in
Cambridge and the coalition's de facto chairman, explained his position,
While I agree that taxation changes are necessary, local
officials should decide the number of teachers and police
not a state referendum.
Thus, many perceived that Propisition 2 1/2 diminished local control over
spending. A Town Accountant in Marshfield said,
I would think that the people that favored 2 1/2 would favor
home rule, but it is working just the other way around. By
cutting down what a town can spend and hoping the state will
subsideize, you are doing away with home rule.
Finally, although there were strong feelings about the impact of cuts,
increased conflicts in authority, competition between departments and
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unions, it was perceived that Proposition 2 1/2 enabled new cooperation
between local officials. This was not expressed in those case studies
where a strong mayor-weak council existed. In these communities, few had
praise for the budget process. However, in Cambridge, city officials
believed that they survived the first year of Proposition 2 1/2 fairly
well. The City Manager claims,
Cambridge handled Prop 2 1/2 well and with a minimum of
turmoil. It survived to a large extent because of educa-
tion and interchange between management and the City Council.
In Arlington, a newly elected selectmen, saw the formation of the committee
to coordinate revenues and fiscal priorities as a model of cooperation
which ensured consensus among local budget officials and that this type of
cross-administrative coordination was essential in dealing with Proposition
2 1/2. As a result of 2 1/2, the Town Meeting voted to form a Town Govern-
ment Reorganization Committee to search for ways to improve the delivery
of services.
In Marshfield, which was the only community to start by prioritizing
its services and to build a joint budget-cutting process between town
officials, there seemed to be a consensus that the struggle to implement
cutbacks was undertaken with great responsibility and fairness. Indeed,
many department heads mentioned being influenced by this cooperation and
unions, too, opened provisions in their contracts to reduce costs. The
question remaining is whether town officials will continue to be able to
draw on these reserves of sacrifice and goodwill during future rounds of
budgetary reductions.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CUTBACK PLANNING PRACTICE
A variety of new factors entered the budget process this year and
made it more complex: the school budget was brought under exectuve control;
binding arbitration was elminated; collective bargaining had to proceed
under new fiscal constraints; local governments were pushed to become more
efficient; and, revenue shortfalls had to be faced. The combination of
these factors strained established patterns and political relationships and
affected the distribution of gains and losses experienced by different
interest groups. This chapter will summarize the difficulties which
surfaced in the cutback process and provide some initial recommendations
for resolving key problems presented by cutback budgeting on the local
level.
A. Overview of Key Problems and Trends
Although many of the local governments analyzed in the Impact: 2 1/2
case studies were able to substantially reduce their "worst case" losses,
they are certainly not clar of the fiscal crisis. Each of the cities faced
another year of 15 percent cuts in the property tax, Proposition 2 1/2
"capped" increases in expenditures at 2.5 percent annually, and first year
losses severely bit into progams and "buffers" for emergency spending needs.
And, as mentioned in the introduction, other fiscal trends do not bode
well for local governments in Massachusetts: increased borrowing costs,
increased dependency on state aid for salaries in essential public services,
rising outlays for expenditures such as pension funds and disability insu-
rance (from 1978 to 1980 these costs rose at an average of 35 percent and
were forecast to continue by James Segal of the Massachusetts Municipal
Association), and continued reductions in federal aid. The results of
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ment heads and unions in these services were the most organized and used
the most conflictual negotiation tactics, and it was difficult to
develop adequate criteria and conduct a thorough efficiency analysis to
compare services and needs. Finally, the potential of new revenue entered
to make it difficult to reject claims for additional funds.
It is interesting to note that in New York City at the height of
its fiscal crisis between 1975 and 1977, all major city functions showed
approximately proportional reductions.(24) Police and fire services were
not protected more than other major city services, including human services.
Certainly, in the case study cities, the mayors had sufficient executive
authority to implement cuts in public safety if they so chose. Both in
Quincy and Salem, the mayors bucked considerable department head and union
resistance to impose their cuts. In the towns, the fragmented authority
structure and the "influencable" nature of town meeting enabled greater
opportunity to create fear that public safety was jeopardized and to
appeal for increases in funds.
For the legislative bodies, it was next impossible to find ways to
change budget priorities presented to them. Few compromises or trade-offs
were presented in the budgets in each department or between departments.
Many of the groups had less budget information to work from than in pre-
vious years, constraining their ability to influence the management's
spending plan. It seemed that the need to present a "balanced budget" and
to convince town meeting and the city council of the budget priorities
was based on a fear that new conflicts would erupt that would be hard to
control. As additional funds became available from state aid and reval-
uation, it was typical for management to designate where the new funds
should be spent. These primarily went to salary settlements for collec-
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these trends will be an ongoing fiscal predicament where local governments
will have to continue to search for an adequate revenue base, determine
where best to target expenditures, and build an organizational effort to
enhance productivity and the quality of services.
A brief review of events and problems in the budget process will serve
as a background for building recommendations to improve the budgeting pro-
cess. By and large, the local goverments framed the problem for coping
with cutbacks resulting from Proposition 2 1/2 in the short-term. The
object of the cutback strategy was to implement cutbacks with a minimum of
resistance, cover necessary fixed costs, protect employees from job lay-
offs, and maintain all essential services. Most agreed with the strategy
to prevent lay-offs and to implment Proposition 2 1/2 with as little dis-
ruption to services as possible. For more politically active governments
such as Arlington and Cambridge, the cutback strategy took on an added
scope to "resist the decline" by pursuing strong efforts to increase the
state share of local funding. In almost all cases, management wanted to
maintain equity in cutbacks by implementing across-the-board reductions.
Authority was consolidated, ostensibly for decision-making purposes to
resolve conflicts, coordinate revenue information, and provide control for
executing the degree of cuts that would have to be made.
However, the proportional strategy changed according to the particular
budgetary politics in each community, following a consistant trend. Not
surprisingly, organized groups, primarily police, fire, and public works
were able to be spared the extent of the cuts that were experienced by
schools, libaries, parks and recreation, and street services. This seemed
to result from the following factors: the public feared that cutbacks in
critical services would jeopardize community health and safety, the depart-
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tive bargaining--police, fire, and to a lesser extent in the schools.
For those that received substantial amounts of aid, some was able to be
put in a stabalization fund for future expenses.
The picture that emerges from this analysis is that local governments
set out to cope with Proposition 2 1/2 within the existing structure of
local politics. Certainly, Proposition 2 1/2 sent a "shock wave" through
the budget-making system and forced multiple new questions into the bud-
geting arena. Some local governments seemed more prepared to deal with
Proposition 2 1/2 than others. Cambridge, Arlington, and Marshfield used
more professional budgeting techniques and more cooperative efforts to
accomplish needed reductions. Others seemed to be immobilized by conflicts
from local officials and other interest groups. However, in coping with
the political realities of cutback budgeting, the following problems
emerged in the process of implementing Proposition 2 1/2. Certainly, not
alll of these conclusions are shared by the different parties to the budget
process, nor by all of the local governments used in this analysis. Rather,
they represent tensions and problems that I have identified in the process
of carrying out the mandate to cut:
1. The lack of an explicit cutback strategy placed critical decisions into
established budget patterns which were not well-equipped to handle
multiple problems from new fiscal constraints, demands from groups,
and the need to promote ways to reduce costs. (Developing a Cutback
Strategy)
2. Decisions between services were bolstered by a very general set of
criteria and were made by central authorities. This created anta-
gonism and enabled decisions to be made more by political pressure
than by what was needed to maintain a representative set of services.
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(Establishing the Legitimacy of Budget Priorities)
3. Revenue uncertainty plagued the ability to set the final distributions
of cuts and forced last-miniute prioritizing of expenditures. (Coping
with Revenue Uncertainty)
4. Resistance to budget-cutting and conflictual negotiation tactics by
both organized labor and central authorities impeded efforts to enhance
productivity and efficiency in local government operations. (Mobilizing
Organizational Potential)
5. The budget process seemed removed from planning and management func-
tions and key information on line-item spending and future needs was
not provided to decision-makers. (Linking Planning and Management
Practices to Budgeting)
6. Political pressure by department heads, unions, and citizen groups
created increased competition and demands among municipal departments.
(Reassessing Policy and Dispute Resolution Procedures)
7. Elected reperesentatives in legislative bodies did not have much of a
role in setting budget priorities and investigating issues related to
cuts. (Rebuilding Citizen Participation and Legislative Involvement)
The broad scope of these problems presents a deliberate challenge to
local government authorities to reassess the budgeting process in light
of cutbacks and to work to improve the ability of local officials to
respond to retrenchment. The brunt of coping with the pressures of created
by fiscal stress fall largely on the budgetary and management systems that
are used in each municipality. Clearly, local government budgeting is not
just a once-a-year activity; it is a continuous process and instrument for
decision-making and communication. The yearly spending plan has the great-
est influence over local government actions by setting the fiscal and pro-
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grammatic framework for future activities. The fact that local government
is a creature of the state and is least able to influence its environment
does not justify inaction. Fiscal federalism and changing relations
between state and local government necessitate developing the capacity
to respond to new situations and to apply political pressure to higher
levels of government to accomodate the need for a stable revenue base and
control over local resources. Local governments were created by the state
to bring decisions closer to the citizens; it is up to citizens and local
officials to ensure that the level and quality of services accurately re-
flects the needs and preferences of each community.
The simplistic argument by a skeptical public that management effi-
ciencies would suffice for budget-cutting and that public services would
not be substantially reduced was not true. Certainly, "seriously reduced"
is a value question. The closure of libraries, reduced access to parks
and recreation services, less maintenance and cleaning of streets begins
to build a cumulative effect. Citizens become depressed about local govern-
ment's ability to make decisions and visible signs of deteriorating ser-
vices can create a lack of pride and involvement in community affairs.
This demoralzation can immobilize necessary efforts to prevent a continuing
loss and eroding of public services. Thus, the value questions about the
level of services desired by the citizenry must by explicitly addressed.
Local governments pared down their services to citizens to more
routine and protective programs. Further cuts carried out in a similar
manner forces citizens, employees, and local officials to choose a bottom-
lin of the quantity and quality of services which must be maintained. For
the most part, trade-offs and service level questions were not seriously
addressed in a systematic manner. Prioritizing became an in-house matter
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and adversarial relations and power politics prevented resolving critical
problems such as the lack of viable revenue options, targeting large cuts
to weaker, but important services, and increased resentment between depart-
ments and employees. Obviously, the heart of local politics is the ability
to respond to constituent interests and bargain over policy issues. Poli-
ticians resist taking public stands and taking part in a process to build
policy and cutback strategies which force them to be more public about
their commitments than they wish to be. However, when politics degenerate
into capricious decisions, local inaction, and domination by a few execu-
tives, the policy and budgeting process must be questioned.
B. Recommendations
Rebuilding the municipal budgeting process is not a simple proposition.
It will mean not only identifying key problem areas and important informa-
tion needed for decision-making, but in some cases restructuring the rela-
tionships among the parties to the budget process. Indeed, recognizing
that innovation is needed and building an accepted course of action will
require careful planning and a significant mobilization of resources and
personnel. At a time when immediate fiscal pressures have placed local
governments into a reactive, short-term posture, this prospect is grim.
However, in each of the case studies, there was movement to improve the
ability of local government to integrate budgeting into other planning
practices and to pursue some efficiency efforts. By and large, the gover-
ments that were researched are reasonably small communities where officials
and citizens are familiar with each other and have a substantial invest-
ment in making the community a viable place to live. The challenge will
be to take the following generalized themes and practices and transform
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them into detailed, specific, and appropriate options.
1. Developing a Cutback Strategy
The choice of cutback strategies sets the problem framework for respon-
ding to revenue reductions. It has been argued in this thesis that this
choice should build on a broader understanding of the political dynamics
affecting local government than purely in terms of administrative responses.
The assessment of political dynamics involve both internal and external
factors. Externally, the movement of statewide politics, fiscal and tax
reforms, local aid forumulas, revenue authority and regulatory reforms
have a direct impact on local government. Internally, demands from depart-
ment heads, unions, employees and special interest groups place constraints
on the choices available to local officials. Indeed a cutback strategy
must confront fiscal and political constraints; strong resistance and poli-
tical pressure; the involvement of other actors while maintaining the leader-
ship of officials; new revenue options and revenue uncertainty; and, produc-
tivity enhancement with a demoralized and reduced workforce. The cutback
strategy then, must deal with the immediate and long-term constraints, as
well as the legitimate concerns of the affected parties.
The development of the cutback strategy must, in my estimation, do more
than deal with difficult dilemmas. It must provide a central rationale for
local government action and detail the general approach and assumptions
guiding the strategy. Levine outlines three basic strategies for cutting
back: denial and delay, resisting the decline, and cutting and smoothing
strategies. Each of these is based on particular assumptions. For example,
"resisting the decline" can rest on the assumption that all measures,
fiscally and politically should be employed to prevent any further loss in
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services and that the reductions should not be implemented. In response,
the cutback strategy may look to designing a political process which seeks
to promote this "resistance" and involve citizens and employees to add a
"push factor" to lobby for funds or specific political proposals. Thus,
the problem framework should be made explicit, outlining the goals and
direction it seeks to take, and the values that underly it. The more that
consensus is reached about this framework among key actors, the more
successful it is likely to be when it comes to implementation.
The following activities can assist the development of the cutback
strategy:
1. Central authorities should initiate a series of meetings in the stage
before actual budget preparation with key officials to outline a
problem framework and to develop goals and assumptions. A short-term
and long-term strategy should be developed which is integrated into
the budget process and targets the town meeting and city council
hearings for feedback and confirmation.
2. The actual impacts of the revenue shortfall in terms of jobs and ser-
vices should be delineated with a set of alternative scenarios to
graphically demonsrate the nature of the problem.
3. Central authorities should develop an "iterative" process which seeks
to develop key issues such as those outlined above, and a timeline for
resolving them.
4. A community forum should be held by leaders to review the strategy,
take feedback, discuss difficult trade-offs between services and
invite citizen participation. A consensus should be reached on the
nature and goals of the cutback strategy.
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2. Establishing the Legitimacy of Budgetary Priorities
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of cutback budgeting is developing
a set of budget priorities that reflect community preferences. At a cer-
tain point it becomes next to impossible to weigh libraries against schools,
police against garbage collection, and parks against human services, etc.
Yet some criteria and decision guidelines are necessary to provide a basis
from which to evaluate where cuts, if they must be imposed should fall.
The proportional strategy first proposed by management was an attempt to
demonstrate equity and maintain the existing spending priorities. Many
citizen groups wanted the cuts to be proportional to support the existing
range of services. Secondarily, as pressure was applied, most local gov-
ernments shifted to targeted cuts bolstered by a set of vague criteria
which sought to "protect public safety', "keep the sewers running", and
"make sure the garbage was collected". Prioritizing that did occur was
usually carried out internal to each department. Department heads sub-
mitted ranking of programs and personnel and then it was up to budget
officials to take this information and set budget levels according to re-
commendations and their perceptions of community needs. These priorities
were then subjected to the push and pull of the political process.
The legitimacy of budget priorities is based on a number of factors:
developing timely, and reliable information on changing community needs,
assessing the performance and effectiveness of existing services, and the
ability to convince local officials and groups that the budget priorities
best represent service demands and the need for a mix of services. As
much as possible, the ability to consider a priori the "felt needs" and
stated demands will help to anticipate the forces that will mobilize to
protect jobs and services. The trade-offs between equity and efficiency
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should be explored and made explicit. Efficiency efforts should be
rewarded. Thus, establishing the legitimacy of spending priorities develops
out of a composite analysis from a variety of sources.
The following activities can assist the development of a set of budget
priorities:
1. Evaluating community needs and spending priorities does not have to
be done every year, but should be done at least every three years
comprehensively with a focus on issues and specific needs in the
intervening years. Planning staff and budget officials should identify
and involve interested and affected parties, including unions, citizen
groups, and neighborhood associations to list needs, complaints, and
prioritize services to their areas.
2. Make use of survey techniques to poll a sample of residents on their
priorities between services (e.g. what is a bottom-line, what would
they reduce first, trade-offs between different types of services, etc.)
3. Measure the costs and outputs of services in a way the taxpayer can
understand and conduct scheduled reviews of all programs and activities.
4. Examine current and prospective changes in the target population and
service demands, both demographically and geographically to determine
if changing patterns in the use of services suggest shifting resources.
5. Identify mandated services and costs and explore possibilities for
changing the reimbursement and investment practices to ensure that
"fixed costs" are fulfuilled in the most cost efficient way.
6. Consider the effects of cuts to various target populations to see if
some groups are disproportionately affected more than others.
7. Assess the equity in cuts between administrative and program personnel
and provide a rationale behind cuts in various positions.
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8. Ask department heads to develop both reduction and improvement packages
among department programs, identifying alternative service levels and
their consequences, with a list of efficiency efforts.
9. Consolidate data into a report to be made public and solicit comments
from citizens in public hearings.
Carrying out the extent of these proposed activities can be costly
and time consuming. Each local government can pick the types of activities
that are most appropriate and target resources to evaluate particularly
important areas. No standardized technique or packaged formula will deter-
mine which services are expendable and to what extent. Local elected offi-
cials must play a central role to clarify expectations, identify critical
services, relate public demand to changes in spending levels, and provide
needed information to accompany the political process.
3. Coping with Revenue Uncertainty
Accurately forecasting the level of revenues delayed setting budget
priorities and was very difficult given thenumber of new variables which
entered the budget process. As mentioned above, priority setting does not
have to be a last minute decision. The use of zero-based budgeting and
program rankings as used in Arlington did provide a list of services which
could be added back once new revenues were found. However, often it became
difficult to coordinate revenue information among the different actors
responsible for revenue figures (e.g. assessor, treasure, finance committee
chair, mayor, manager, etc.). Different levels of revenues would be pro-
jected given a wide variety of assumptions without verification. Some of
this uncertainty could not be avoided. The trouble was in integrating
budget priorities and services to unknown service levels. Rumors often
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circulated about who would be losing their jobs and which services were
being cut without a substantive basis from which to affirm or deny the
speculation. Complicating the picture was that the "worst case" budget
predictions served a political purpose to argue for more funds and induce
cooperation from department heads and unions.
A number of tactics can be suggested to cope with the problem of
revenue uncertainty.
1. Early formation (at the beginning of the budget process) of a revenue
task force made up of key officials to evaluate revenue possibilities
and coordinate information and decisions on bottom-line revenue levels.
2. New revenue options should be evaluated by citizens and elected offi-
cials as to their progressivity or regressivity, stability, and balance
of resource mix.
3. A range of revenue estimates should be developed with corresponding
impacts on budget priorities in terms of both services and personnel
by the task force.
4. Carefully inventory all revenue producing measures with a list of
assumptions to guide revenue forecasting and to review for future
analysis.
Forecasting revenue requres experience and technical expertise. How-
ever, uncertainty does not have to prevent the ability to set budget prior-
ities and the ability to negotiate effectively with departments and groups.
In fact, the current and prospective fiscal constraints and the "ability-
to-pay" argument should be open to scrutiny by members of the community.
4. Mobilizing Organizational Potential
Retrenchment in the local government "organization", namely the depart-
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ments, programs, and jobs which comprise it, eroded morale, created con-
flicts between departments, within employee groups, and potentially between
workers and the public, reducing the sense of control members of the organi-
zation have. The control by management of much of the priority setting,
while necessary in setting the level of cutbacks, engendered resentment and
conflicts which precluded important movement on efficiency measures, agree-
ment by some unions to open contracts, and cooperation by department heads
to make line-item cuts which would not create long-term damage. The decline
in resources makes it difficult to create "win-win" situations whereby
those who are losing aspects of the struggle can by compensated by other
payments. Cutting back means reducing the organization's purposes: it can
no longer do all that it once did. Thus, the issue of how, where, and when
the cuts are to be made is of direct importance to all members of the org-
anization. Without a clear signal as to what purposes are being retained
and why, members lose the value of their contribution, and hence their
desire to participate in it.
In order to sustain and build the local government effort to prevent
the degenration of the quality of services and the resource base, it is
important to be able to explain what the organization is "for" -- its
goals and and purposes. The development of the cutback strategy, with wide
participation from groups, employees, and elected officials is an excellent
opportunity to provide a sense that the members of local government are
controlling its destiny and to fully understand what sacrifices need to be
made. This is especially true for those groups who felt excluded from
the cutback process -- city councils, citizen advisory groups, unions, and
department heads. Unless some measure is taken to work cooperatively with
these groups, they will continue to sabotage and resist the cutback process.
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The process established in Marshfield, was perhaps, the most successful in
gaining cooperation from departments and employees.
The following activities may be useful in mobilizing organizational
potential:
1. Conduct a goal-setting process wth elected officials and citizens to
provide a framework for the cutback strategy. Develop comprehensive
listing of program objectives and priorities.
2. Develop similar listing of program priorities with department heads
and employees.
3. Compare department employees and management priorities with elected
officials and set meeting to discuss and reconcile differences.
4. Establish committees within major program areas composed of depart-
ment personnel to review and propose efficiency measures and to monitor
the quality of work and service problems.
5. Develop an overview committee of elected officials, management, employee
representatives and citizens to compile proposed efficiency or reorgan-
ization efforts and provide accountability to other workplace committees.
6. Develop incentive measures such as public awareds, reduction in lost-
time days, job sharing, participation in decision-making,etc., for
department employees and to build commitment to program objectives.
The goal of these measures, and there are many other types to be used
is to build the involvement of employees in the work potential of the local
government from within the organization. Democratic management of the
workplace has gained greater currency in the private sector, but has not
been seriously considered in the public sector.. Cutbacks have forced a
critical re-examination of work practices that has been felt throughout
the entire organization. The creative involvement of employees and staff
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in the identification of resource constraints and ways to improve work
could perhaps, significantly reduce costs in ways that do not cut as deeply
into services and personnel.
5. Linking Management and Planning Practices to Budgeting
Passing a budget is but one aspect of the budget process. The budget
process is perhaps.the only time that citizens and elected officials are
directly involved in making revenue and expenditure decisions for the
community as a whole. As such, the information transmitted during budget
hearings and the budget process is critical for decision-makers to stay
abreast of government activities. In the case studies, there were numerous
complaints that there was a lack of information on which to base the budget
decisions. In some cases, officials did not receive the same amount of
detailed information as they had in previous years. It seemed that the
object of the budget process was to get a budget passed with a minimum of
conflict. One way to do this was to provide little information and detailed
explanation of the budget items. Rather, budget discussion would have to
center on a general overview of priorities, than to thoroughly examine
line-items and trade-offs. Even then, the push for a balanced budget
attempted to remove debate over articles of spending.
The ability to improve management and planning practices and then to
link them to more effective budgeting, will in part be dependent on the
importance placed on the budgeting system. In cases where management
is carrying out "minimal" budgeting, they will have to be pushed to make
it a priority. Information that is needed for decision-making should be
identified, both on a year-round basis and for issue-oriented needs. Short
and long-range planning process (if available) should be structured in such
a way to develop specific proposals for evaluation by decision-makers.
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Performance assessment should provide information citizens understand and
should be set in measurable units. If it is diificult to quantify the out-
comes of the services, on-site review systems can provide feedback on the
effectiveness of services. Management systems have become increasingly
sophisticated: computerization of information, the generation of reports,
and data processing can proivde more timely and reliable feedback to local
officials. Sometimes these processes are costly, but are the necessary
expenses of staying informed -- and in the long-run may help to reduce
costs.
The following steps may be useful in linking management and planning
to the budget process:
1. Local officials desiring more management and planning information should
develop support form other officials and citizens to identify problems
resulting from the cutback budget process.
2. Call a meeting with local officials, executives, department heads, and
interested citizens to review the budget process, budget documents and
and their relevance for decision-making.
3. Detail minimum and ideal information requirements for each department,
timeline for presentation during the budget cycle, and the method for
presentation.
4. Reassess management and planning capacity to meet information require-
ments and plan steps to reorient to the budgeting process.
6. Reassessment of Authority for Policy and Dispute Resolution
The centralization of budgetary authority produced conflicts over the
respective roles of formal budget groups. In the cities, substantial con-
flict emerged over the role of the city councils in the budget process.
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While this is typical, cutbacks raised the stakes considerably and made
the setting of budget priorities of ciritcal importance to council members.
Instead, their involvement was minimal and the priority-setting primarily
the role of the mayors. It was difficult to re-establish a role for the
councils except where there were efforts to build a citizen advisory
board to investigate revenues and fiscal priorities. The lesson learned
for the city councils is that they had to actively pressure the mayors and
to create their own institutions to bring about greater involvement in
the budget process. Only in Cambridge, with a Council-Manager form of
government did existing roles and relationship stay intact without sub-
stantial conflict. Here, power over budget priorities seemed to be shared
between the Council and City Manager and the Council took the role to
resolve budget conflicts.
In the towns, conflicts between selectmen, administrators, and advi-
sory groups impeded setting budget priorities. Some of these conflicts
are of course to be expected with fragmented authorities. However, there
was general difficulty in agreeing upon who had responsibility for policy
and program evaluation. Battles were waged over whose priorities would
finally be incorporated into the final budget. Thus, differences in
policy and cutback strategy made it hard to respond effectively to demands
from department heads, unions, interest groups, and problems on revenue
levels.
It is difficult to say what form of local government is best suited
to promoting an effective budgeting process. In both heavily centralized
and fragmented governments there was substantial conflict. Conflicts are
also related to leadership styles, personalities of politicians, and the
particular positions of individuals occupying positions of authority.
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Certainly, cutbacks sharpen authority and policy issues and ambiguity that
exists will create confusion and greater power struggles if it is not clar-
ified. The following questions over roles and responsibilities and proce-
dures for dispute resolution will be difficult to answer,but should be
addressed: What authority should department heads have over line-item
spending? What role should administrators have in initiating policy? How
effective are part-time officials and citizens in setting policy and
priorities? With which authorities and over what conflicts should con-
flicts and grievances be taken for resolution?
As competition developed between departments and groups for funds,
threatening tactics were used to save program funding, and the potential
of strikes was considered more likely. Anticipating these conflicts and
developing procedures to resolve them may prevent costly strikes and legal
suits. Similarly, the above questions should be re-examined in light of
conflicts that developed in the budget process to help improve future
budgeting efforts. Centralizing the budget process because of the fear
of irresolvable conflicts should not be a reason to exclude groups from
participation in the budget process. Conflicts should be expected with
decisions made according to accepted policies.
The following activities may be useful:
1. Set-up a joint committee of elected officials, managers, and citizens
to identify and review conflicts in the budget process and existing
procedures to resolve them.
2. Establish criteria for policy issues and their linkage to management.
Review authority for conflict resoution, and which issues should be
dealt with where and with whom.
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3. Developed structured group processes for legislative groups and
training sessions to improve communication, simulate possible conflicts,
and decision-making methods.
4. Reassess the procedures for collecting information from administrators,
special interest groups, and unions. Develop procedures for resolving
conflicts, developing accountability mechanisms between executives and
legislative groups, and follow-up on disputes.
7. Rebuilding Citizen Participation and Legislative Involvement
This section is more or less a continuation of the previous one. Its
purpose is to present some ideas related to improving citizen involvement
and increasing the ability of legislative representatives to understand
key issues, the demand for servcies, and to translate needs and wants into
more specific proposals for consideration and decision. In the case studies,
tactics to resist cuts had to become more and more conflictual in order
to be effective in being heard. Groups with more power and more pressure
were able to win this game. With these tactics it is often the minority
voice which is left out and not heard. Although the lack of public partici-
pation can be attribdted to a number of reasons, the lack of meaningful
opportunities for involvement is effective in reducing participation. Even
at town meetings, representatives often felt stymied in their ability to
respond to budget proposals and be contributing members to the budget pro-
cess. Town meeting has to become more purposeful and functional. For the
city councillors, building a strong citizen budget committee was one of
the few ways to gain entry to the prioritization process. Certainly, there
has to be a more effective means to engate citizens and customers in the
search for an adequate level and quality of public services.
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Few local officials endorse citizen participation as a means of redis-
tributing power or decentralizing control over resource allocation decisions.
Indeed, it is often perceived as a threat to the established patterns in
local government. As control over decisions were centralized, opening
local governemtn to greater participation seems remote. In this sense,
advocating for increased participation by citizens and organized groups
will take solid political organizing to convince officials to accept grea-
ter public participation. Pressure by groups who can articulate demands,
present alternative budgets, and investigate spending patterns will be more
effective in gaining entry to the budget process. After all, more partici-
pation can be a useful addition to the normal machinery of representative
democracy and can provide legitimacy to budget cuts and cutback strategies.
Building citizen involvement committees on key aspects of the budget
to work among elected representatives, and special interest groups, and
the general public can helpt to interpret needs and develop policies.
Committees on spending priorities, efficiency, management reforms, and
worker involvement could be likely areas for citizen participation. The
use of neghborhood associations in planning efforts can build a greater
capacity to respond to needs in local areas. With a multiplicity of
divergent demands descending upon local officials, it makes sense to engage
in structured bargaining in which all the parties with an interest at stake
work together to achieve a negotiated settlement. As referred to in the
previous section, procedures for dispute resolution should be developed.
Finally, the building of citizen-based planning mechanisms and the encou-
ragement of neighborhood participation, can build an effective organization
to lobby for proposals at the state level for greater local control and
progressive tax policies to enable local governments to maintain the ser-
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vices desired by the citizenry.
Because of the schope of the above discussion, I am not listing acti-
vities to rebuild citizen participation and legislative involvement, save
to encourage elected officials and citizens alike to build a better two-way
communication to respond to an ongoing fiscal crisis of local governments.
C. A Final Statement
In writing this thesis, I have continually asked myself, what is the
larger significance of retrenchment politics at the local level? The story
of policiticians and administrators struggling to implement cutbacks and
to make hard choices they did not always agree with is a story of strained
relations and power politics. This is certainly not surprising. In the
recent literature on cutback budgeting, scholars have sought to show that
cutbacks present opportunities to produce more efficient local government,
new forms of public participation, new purposes for government activity,
and greater democratic planning. This thesis is dedicated to the effort
to rebuild government effort -- not as an intrusion into people's lives,
but as an effective decision-maker, anticipator of community problems,
and promoter of a healthy and viable community in which to live. I am
sobered by what I have learned from my analysis of the ten local govern-
ments. Some were much more "successful" than others in coping with cut-
backs. But conflicts became internalized, positions severely fractured
relationships and movement to rebuild the organization was impeded by many
political and fiscal constraints.
Local government's fiscal crisis must be understood in the overarching
"fiscal crisis of the state" and informed by current problems such as the
lack of affordable housing, unemployment, costly health care, and high inte-
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rest rates. Currently there is a lack of solutions put forward to tackle
these problems; they are traditionally set within growth politics and re-
distribution from within the existing relationships in the provate economy.
We are now in an era of unprecedented hard choices over the allocation and
definition of public goods, the definition of social goals, and the justice
and equity of both bureaucratic procedures and planning decisions. Planners
find themselves in an increasingly political context -- confronting com-
peting claims for goods and services, and an increasing class struggle to
maintain a standard of living.
The struggle in cutbacks represents, in so far as it will occur and
opportunities are provided, a repoliticization of individuals and groups;
by being more sure about what we are "for" and designing pragmatic and
participatory ways to get there, can we animate a more meaningful democracy.
Perhaps we will let a "democratic elite" make many of the hard choices we
shall face in this decade. This may be fine when the current paradigm is
working to solve local problems. But, I believe that this is a time when
current practices are under severe questions. It is not good enough to
believe in a good process. We must discuss and debate outcomes and deter-
mine ways to effectively control available resources. Innovation will take
time and so will restructuring our existing relationships. We cannot
expect politicians or administrators to inspire efficiencies or make
equitable solutions. For me, the significance of cutback budgeting, is
the recognition that solid political organizing, blended by specific and
articulate plans, is necessary to create progressive "movement on this and
future occasions".
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